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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
“Federal Circuit”) decided a number of interesting trademark cases
in 1999 and, in some instances, made new law.  At the closing of
1999, the Federal Circuit heard and decided sixteen trademark
cases;1 however, only three-fourths of them constitute precedent for
                                                                
1. See Gamut Trading Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 200 F.3d 775,
784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (restricting import of
trademarked “gray market” goods); In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373-74, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (refusing to allow registration of
claimed trademark for “The Best Beer in America”); In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1301-
02, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (prohibiting registration of
geographically misdescriptive trademark); L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d
1349, 1352, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Kichler II]
(declining to cancel federal registration of trade dress based on claim of § 2(f)
fraud); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Tocad Co., No. 99-1128, 1999 WL 668722, *2
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (declining to cancel the trademark
“Aqua Floss” despite its similarities to “Aqua Fresh”); In re American Fertility Soc’y,
188 F.3d 1341, 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (remanding a
trademark determination for consideration of whether the name was generic); In re
Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1518
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (denying application for “phantom” trademarks); Zenith Elec. Corp.
v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1352, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (indicating that Lanham Act unfair competition claims don’t necessarily
conflict with the patent and antitrust laws); Pep Boys Manny v. Cherng Lian Ent Co.,
No. 99-1271, 1999 WL 595145, *1 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 1999) (unpublished opinion)
(dismissing appeal raised in opposition to competitor’s application for trademark
registration based on claims of confusion and dilution); Riggs Mktg. v. Mitchell, No.
98-1507, 98-1551, 1999 WL 399710, *6 (Fed. Cir. June 8, 1999) (unpublished
opinion) (concluding that Mitchell’s golf-club bending machine infringed
competitor’s patent, but denying that competitor’s trademark had acquired
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the new millennium.  Of all the Federal Circuit trademark cases
decided in 1999, half contain issues of first impression or holdings
that broaden or overrule previous decisions.2  In addition, the court
reversed or vacated lower decisions seven times, further evidencing
the Federal Circuit’s reputation for independent thinking.3
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADDRESSES PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Several of the 1999 Federal Circuit trademark decisions were
significant for procedural reasons.  The Court addressed:  the
                                                                
secondary meaning); Amp Plus, Inc. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., No. 581, 582, 1999 WL
426393, *1 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (denying a petition for
interlocutory appeal); In re Storopack Hans Reichenecker GmbH & Co., No. 98-1588,
1999 WL 302320, *1 (Fed. Cir. May 6, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (declining to
grant a trademark registration because the product name was simply descriptive);
Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1672, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (applying Federal Circuit law instead of
Eighth Circuit law in considering questions of substantive patent law); Sunrise
Jewelry Mfg. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532, 1536 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (holding that registration of trade dress which is generic may be
cancelled); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, 174 F.3d 1308, 1317, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming in part the determination that patent for hanger
used to display non-prescription eyeglasses was literally infringed); Ritchie v.
Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1097, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(granting an individual standing to challenge proposed trademarks by O.J. Simpson)
[hereinafter “Ritchie II”], rev’g Ritchie v. Simpson, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859
(T.T.A.B. 1996) [hereinafter “Ritchie I”].
2. See Wada, 194 F.3d at 1299-1300, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542 (affirming
rejection of application seeking to register mark “NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY” for
various leather products, and holding that mark was geographically misdescriptive,
and therefore was not registerable); American Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d at 1345-48, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (vacating board’s ruling that mark was generic due to
application of an incorrect legal standard); Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1365-66, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (ruling broadly that “phantom” trademarks cannot be
federally registered); Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1346, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341
(retaining jurisdiction even though all patent claims had been dismissed); Pep Boys,
1999 WL 595145 at *1 (restricting ability to appeal); Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1359,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (overruling three prior decisions); Sunrise Jewelry, 175
F.3d at 1326-27, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536 (expanding the applicability of generic
trade dress); Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1093, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (expanding
the standing doctrine for third parties to challenge proposed trademarks).
3. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (reversing and
remanding); Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1332, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177 (affirming in
part, reversing in part); Sunrise Jewelry, 175 F.3d at 1343, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536
(affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding); Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at
1365, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (reversing and remanding); Riggs Mktg., 1999 WL
399710, at *6 (reversing in part, affirming in part); Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d at
1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837-38 (vacating and remanding); Kichler II, 192 F.3d
at 1353, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (reversing and remanding); see also Stephen R.
Baird, Review of the 1993 Trademark Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
43 AM. U. L. REV. 1559, 1583 (1994) (noting the Federal Circuit’s 1993 decisions
reflected “independent thinking”); cf. William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil,
Judicial Hyperactivity:  The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 725, 729 (2000) (arguing that “the Federal Circuit has been dogged with
criticism for straying from the path carefully delineated for appellate tribunals.”).
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appropriate standard of review of United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) fact-finding, standing to oppose
“scandalous” and “immoral” trademarks, conflicts of federal laws,
choice of law, preemption of conflicting state laws, and various
appeals.4
A. Standard of Review
The Federal Circuit reviews legal conclusions de novo.5  Until this
year, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected arguments by the Solicitor
General that the less stringent Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)6
review standards should govern its review of factual findings made by
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) of the PTO.7
Instead, the Federal Circuit continued to review the PTO’s findings
of fact for “clear error,” analogous to an appellate court’s review of a
district court’s fact-finding.8
Following the United States Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in
Dickinson v. Zurko,9 the Federal Circuit began following the APA’s
“arbitrary, capricious,” standard of review, which expressly governs
judicial review of facts found by federal administrative agencies.10
The Federal Circuit applied the APA review framework in four
                                                                
4. See infra Parts I.A-I.E (discussing the range of procedural issues addressed by
the Federal Circuit during 1999).
5. See Wada, 194 F.3d at 1302, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542 (prohibiting the
registration of geographically misdescriptive trademarks); see also Int’l Flavors, 183
F.3d at 1365, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515 (recognizing that the Federal Circuit will
review legal conclusions, such as those made under the Lanham Act, de novo).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing standards of review under
the APA for review of agency action).
7. See In re Dixie Restaurants, 105 F.3d 1405, 1406 n.*, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1531, 1533 n.a1 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting a less stringent APA “arbitrary and
capricious” standard in evaluating factual conclusions).
8. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691, 1701 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc) [hereinafter “Zurko I”] (reversing a PTO decision rejecting a
patent relating to improvements of computer security systems), rev’d sub nom.
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930 (1999) [hereinafter
“Zurko II”] (indicating that the Federal Circuit applied the incorrect “clearly
erroneous” standard rather than the “arbitrary and capricious” standard required
under the APA).
9. 527 U.S. 150, 153-54, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930, 1932 (1999) (discussing the
arbitrariness standard).  In Zurko I, the Federal Circuit en banc applied a “clearly
erroneous” standard of review in reversing the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences’ decision to reject a patent application for a computer system security
method.  See Zurko I, 142 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693.  In Zurko II, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to apply the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) standards of review.  See Zurko II, 527 U.S. at 165, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1936-37; cf. Wada, 194 F.3d at 1299, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1540 (applying Zurko II).
10. See Zurko II, 527 U.S. at 152-53, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (citing the APA,
5 U.S.C. § 706).
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trademark cases during the last part of 1999.11  Because the Supreme
Court did not explain which of the two possible APA standards of
review govern appeals of PTO fact-finding, however, these decisions
have not provided clarity in this area of the law.  Whether the Federal
Circuit will decide to apply the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious, [or]
abuse of discretion”12 standard or the “unsupported by substantial
evidence”13 standard to PTO fact-finding remains unclear.14  In its
1999 trademark decisions, the Federal Circuit recognized the
Supreme Court’s failure to instruct which of the two possible APA
standards should govern PTO fact-finding; however, the court did not
undertake to resolve which standard it will apply.15  None of the cases
before the Federal Circuit in 1999 turned on a distinction between
these standards.16
                                                                
11. See In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056,
1056 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Wada, 194 F.3d at 1299, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540;
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Tocad Co., No. 99-1128, 1999 WL 668722, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished opinion); In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183
F.3d 1361, 1365, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
12. The Supreme Court has described the “arbitrary, capricious, [or] abuse of
discretion” standard as requiring a court to ask whether “the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”  Motor Vehicle
Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 43 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
13. The Supreme Court “has described the APA court/agency ‘substantial
evidence’ standard as requiring a court to ask whether a ‘reasonable mind might
accept’ a particular evidentiary record as ‘adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Zurko
II, 527 U.S. at 162 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)).
14. See id. at 162-63 (indicating that the distinction between the two standards is a
subtle one).
15. See Boston Beer, 198 F.3d at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (declaring it
unnecessary to determine which standard should be applied on these facts); Int’l
Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515 (declining to determine
which standard should be applied).
16. See Boston Beer, 198 F.3d at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (“Because the
Board’s present findings of fact would be upheld under any of the APA standards of
review, it is unnecessary to make that determination here.”); Wada, 194 F.3d at 1299,
52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540 (“We uphold the Board’s factual determinations unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or unsupported by substantial
evidence.”); SmithKline, 1999 WL 668722, at *1 (“[W]e will affirm the Board’s factual
determinations unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence or are otherwise
arbitrary, capricious, or constitute an abuse of discretion.”); Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at
1365, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515 (“The Supreme Court in Zurko [II] left
undecided which standard . . . must be applied to review Board findings.  This,
however, is not the case in which to make that determination.  The Board’s present
findings of fact would be upheld under any of the APA standards of review.”).
Perhaps the Federal Circuit ultimately will conclude there is no meaningful
difference between the two possible APA standards of review.  See Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (finding no substantive difference between the APA’s
“arbitrary, capricious” standard and its “substantial evidence” standard as applied to
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B. Standing to Oppose an “Immoral” or “Scandalous” Mark
In Ritchie v. Simpson,17 the majority of a divided panel of the Federal
Circuit declined the invitation—in an emotionally-charged Section
2(a)18 case—to interpret more narrowly the standing requirements
for trademark oppositions, as set forth in Section 13 of the Lanham
Act.19  In doing so, according to the sharply worded dissent issued by
Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, the “panel majority has created a
dangerous and facile opportunity for the intermeddling public to
burden commercial rights in which it has no interest, contravening
the precedent of this Court and the Supreme Court.”20  She also
indicated that the opposer’s “right to abhor Mr. Simpson’s persona
does not grant him standing to deprive Mr. Simpson of the right of
statutory trademark registration.”21  The panel majority’s decision
probably reached the correct result in permitting standing, albeit
after expending unnecessary labor and effort.  The panel majority
                                                                
court review of agency fact-finding).
17. 170 F.3d 1092, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (challenging
proposed trademarks relating to “O.J. Simpson,” “O.J.,” and “The Juice”).  The 2-1
decision featured a dissent that relied on Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1101-02, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031; see also Sierra Club,
405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 755
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  In Sierra Club, members of the Sierra Club sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions to end development of part of the Sequoia
National Forest into a ski resort and summer recreation area.  405 U.S. at 730.  The
Sierra Club looked to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (as
amended), to establish standing.  This section states:  “A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”  Id. at 732-33.
The Sierra Club alleged injury via changes in the aesthetics and ecology of the
wildlife area.  Id. at 734.  The Supreme Court, however, held that the Club lacked
standing, because the members failed to allege that they used the park and, in fact,
would be injured by the changes.  Id. at 734-35.  With regard to standing via a non-
economic interest, the court stated that “a mere interest in a problem . . . is not
sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’
within the meaning of the APA.”  Id. at 739.
Although Ritchie’s allegations that he would be damaged if Simpson were granted
registration of the disputed trademarks appear to satisfy even the possibly more
strenuous standing test under the APA, neither the APA nor Sierra Club are
controlling because § 13 of the Lanham Act has a specific provision regulating
standing in connection with trademark oppositions.  See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1095,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1994) (dictating the § 13
standing provisions).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994) (authorizing refusal of registration for
material that “consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or
matter which may disparage . . . persons, . . . institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,
or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. . . .”).
19. See id. § 1063 (providing for private opposition to a proposed trademark
registration); see also Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1094, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024
(granting Ritchie standing to challenge the proposed trademarks).
20. Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024.
21. Id. at 1104, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
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accomplished this despite a sloppy and inaccurate reading of the
statute and a failure to expose the various strawman concerns erected
by the Board and endorsed by the dissent.
O.J. Simpson, the well-known football celebrity (now more
infamous than famous) who was accused of murder, acquitted in the
criminal proceeding, but found liable for the death of both victims in
a later civil proceeding,22 filed various intent-to-use applications
(apparently from his jail cell).  He sought federal registration of his
name and related nicknames, including “O.J. Simpson,” “O.J.,” and
“The Juice.”23
Ritchie, a Concord, New Hampshire intellectual property attorney
who was apparently aware of the ever developing Section 2(a)
commentary24 and case law,25 sought to oppose the marks under
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.26  This section forbids the
registration of marks that consist of or comprise, inter alia,
“immoral . . . or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage . . . persons,. . . institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or
                                                                
22. See Stephanie Simon & Jim Newton, Simpson Civil Case News Analysis:  Jury
Heard Much Different Case in Civil Trial, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A15 (reporting
that O.J. Simpson was found liable for the deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron
Goldman in civil trial).
23. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1093, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024.
24. See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena:  Banning the
Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 676 (1993)
(“Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is a largely untapped and unique source of
protection for religious, racial, and other groups that may be offended by the subject
matter of certain trademark registrations or registration applications.”).  But see
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter
Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act:  Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered
Trademarks?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 801, 858-59 (1993) (“[A] proper application of
standing doctrine to the Act . . . would limit greatly the ability of individuals lacking
alternative statutory grounds to contest a registration merely by alleging that the
mark itself is scandalous, immoral, or disparaging.”).
25. See, e.g., Order of Sons of Italy in Am. v. Profumi Fratelli Nostra Ag, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221, 1223 (T.T.A.B. 1995) (standing recognized for fraternal
order of Italian Americans in § 2(a) case to challenge a trademark with Mafia
connotations); Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1830 (T.T.A.B.
1994) (standing recognized for a group of Native American leaders in § 2(a) case
seeking to challenge the trademark held by the Washington Redskins) [hereinafter
“Harjo I”].
Years after the filing of Ritchie’s opposition in December of 1995, it became
apparent that similar challenges also may succeed on the merits.  See Harjo v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1749 (1999) [hereinafter “Harjo II”]
(granting a § 2(a) Petition for Cancellation filed by a group of Native American
leaders against the incontestable federal registrations containing the term “redskin,”
owned by the Washington Redskins football club).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing for private challenges
to the registration of trademarks consisting of scandalous matter).  The Ritchie II
court made three attempts to accurately paraphrase and/or quote § 2(a), but on
each attempt it failed miserably.  See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1094, 1098, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1024, 1028.
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bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”27  Simpson, however, moved
to dismiss the opposition on the ground that Ritchie lacked the
requisite standing to go before the Board.28  The Board agreed with
Simpson and dismissed Ritchie’s claim.29
The Board’s decision to dismiss, however, was riddled with
problems.  First, although the Board acknowledged that Ritchie’s
opposition was based on Section 2(a),30 it disregarded the exact
language of Ritchie’s “Notice of Opposition,” which specifically
supported a challenge under the separate and distinct
“disparagement” prong of Section 2(a).31  The Board, instead,
evaluated the sufficiency of Ritchie’s pleading only under the
“scandalous” and “immoral” prongs of Section 2(a),32 despite the fact
that Ritchie never pled in his “Notice of Opposition” that Simpson’s
marks were “immoral” under Section 2(a).33  Accordingly, the Board
should have evaluated Ritchie’s standing with respect to the
“scandalous” ground and the “disparagement” ground, both of which
were pled in Ritchie’s “Notice of Opposition.”34
Second, the Board determined that Ritchie had not pled specific
facts demonstrating his “personal interest in the proceeding beyond
that of the general public,”35 despite the following allegations in
Ritchie’s “Notice of Opposition:”
                                                                
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
28. See Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859, 1860 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
29. See id. at 1862.
30. See id. at 1860 (“Ritchie has filed an opposition . . . under § 2(a) and
§ 2(e)(4).”).
31. The term disparagement and other forms of that word appear no less than
three times in Ritchie’s Notice of Opposition.  See Notice of Opposition ¶ 1, at 2, ¶ 3,
at 3, and ¶ 13, at 6, Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (PTO Opp.
No. 101186) [hereinafter Notice of Opposition, Ritchie I (PTO Opp. No. 101186)].
32. See Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861.
33. A careful reading of the publicly available Notice of Opposition filed by
Ritchie reveals that the word “immoral” never appears in it.  See Notice of
Opposition, Ritchie I (PTO Opp. No. 101186).  The word “moral” appears only one
time and only in support of Ritchie’s “scandalous” ground of opposition.  Id. ¶ 2, at 3
(“Opposer believes that this mark is scandalous as it is shocking to the sense of
propriety, offensive to one’s conscience and moral feelings, and calls out for
condemnation.”).
34. Perhaps the Board focused on the “scandalous” prong of § 2(a) in evaluating
Ritchie’s standing, because his pleading of that ground more closely tracked the
language of the “immoral and scandalous” portion of § 2(a) and related case law.
Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  For example,
Ritchie pled that Simpson’s mark “disparages [his] values,” and ridicules opposer’s
belief in the family ideal.  Notice of Opposition ¶ 1, at 2, Ritchie I (PTO Opp. No.
101186).  Although the Lanham Act forbids registration of marks that “may
disparage . . . beliefs . . . , or bring them into contempt or disrepute,” and not protect
“values,” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), Ritchie’s pleading was close enough that he should
have been able to amend his Notice of Opposition to avoid dismissal.
35. Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861 (citing Jewelers Vigilance Comm. v.
Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2021 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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(1) “Opposer . . . believes that he will be damaged by registration”;
(2) “this mark disparages Opposer’s values, especially those values
relating to his family”; (3) O.J. is “synonymous with wife beater and
wife murderer”; (4) “[u]se of the applicant’s surname or
nickname . . . as a trademark to market . . . products . . . intended
for children . . . ridicules the Opposer’s belief in that family ideal”;
(5) “this mark is scandalous as it is shocking to the sense of
propriety, offensive to one’s conscience and moral feelings, and
calls out for condemnation”; (6) “Opposer is a family man and a
member of the potentially damaged group”; (7) “Applicant’s mark
equates with domestic violence and spousal abuse in its most severe
form”; and (8) “registration of the applicant’s mark will be
damaging to the Opposer as well as others who share his sense of
propriety and values.”36
Each allegation should have been deemed true for the purpose of
establishing Ritchie’s standing as well as ruling on Simpson’s motion
to dismiss.37
Third, the Board ruled that Ritchie’s allegations were “not
sufficient to state a reasonable basis for a belief on his part that he
personally [would] be damaged by the registration of these marks.”38
The Board’s ruling disregarded the fact that Ritchie “obtained
petitions from people all over the United States who agree that the
[marks at issue are] scandalous and denigrate[] their values.”39  This
allegation, taken as true for the purpose of resolving Simpson’s
motion to dismiss, should have sufficed to demonstrate that Ritchie’s
claim of damage was objectively reasonable and not purely the
subjective belief of a single irrational individual.40
Fourth, the Board created a strawman to dismantle later by
characterizing Ritchie’s allegations as directed at the applicant, O.J.
Simpson, instead of at the disputed marks.41  The Board suggested
that the “essence of opposer’s pleading is . . . that he and others
believe that the man who seeks to register those marks has committed
acts that they find offensive.”42  It continued by stating that to
recognize standing for Ritchie “would be, in effect, [to find] that an
                                                                
36. Notice of Opposition ¶¶ 1-3, 9, 14, at 1-3, 5, 6, Ritchie I (PTO Opp. No.
101186).
37. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1097, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (requiring that a
complaint must be construed in favor of the complaining party).
38. Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861.
39. Id. at 1860.
40. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1097, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (indicating that
Ritchie’s asserted beliefs in a nurturing marital relationship would be harmed by the
disputed marks which opposer argued were synonymous with “wife-beater”).
41. See Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861.
42. Id.
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opposer’s pleading of feelings of moral outrage directed toward a
person (either an individual or a corporate ‘person’) is a sufficient
pleading of standing to oppose, on § 2(a) ‘scandalous’ and ‘immoral’
grounds, the registration of that person’s name as a trademark.” 43
The Board could not have been more wrong.
Lastly, the Board unnecessarily worried that granting Ritchie
standing,
would seem to open the way for any individual to challenge the
registration of an individual’s or corporation’s trademark or service
mark, where that individual opposer pleads, for example, that he
or she is offended by the individual or corporate trademark
applicant’s products or its hiring policies, political affiliation,
environmental record, advertising campaigns, etc.44
The Board correctly stated that Section 13 of the Lanham Act was
not “intended to have such a result,”45 but incorrectly stated that
granting standing to Ritchie would open the door to that result.  A
careful reading of Ritchie’s “Notice of Opposition” makes it
abundantly clear that Ritchie’s allegations were directed to the marks
at issue (as they must be), not at the applicant.46
On appeal, the panel majority of the Federal Circuit reached the
correct conclusion and reversed the Board’s dismissal of Ritchie’s
opposition;47 however, the court  floundered in its reasoning at times.
Properly noting that the rigorous Article III constitutional restrictions
for standing do not apply to administrative proceedings,48 the Federal
Circuit first looked to Section 13 of the Lanham Act, which broadly
states:  “Any person who believes that he would be damaged by the
registration of a mark upon the principal register may, upon payment
of the prescribed fee, file an opposition in the Patent and Trademark
Office, stating the grounds therefore.”49  In addition, the panel
majority correctly noted that a “judicial gloss” has been added to
Section 13, requiring two additional showings for standing to exist:
(1) the opposer or petitioner must have a “real interest” in the
                                                                
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally Notice of Opposition, Ritchie I (PTO Opp. No. 101186)
(demonstrating that opposer’s allegations were directed at the marks themselves and
not the applicant).
47. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1093, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024 (recognizing
Ritchie’s standing to file suit in opposition to federal registration of proposed
trademarks).
48. See id. at 1094-95, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024-25 (citing several decisions
and other authority showing that the “case and controversy” requirement of U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, does not apply to administrative proceedings).
49. Id. at 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1994)).
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proceeding; and (2) “must have a ‘reasonable’ basis for his belief of
damage.”50
The panel majority correctly observed that the “real interest” test
requires the opposer to show a “legitimate personal interest in the
opposition”51 or, in other words, “a direct and personal stake in the
outcome of the opposition.”52  The panel unnecessarily struggled,
however, with the Board’s holding and the dissent’s argument that
Ritchie lacked standing to oppose Simpson’s marks because his
interest was not “beyond that of the general public.”53  In fact,
Ritchie’s alleged belief in damage went “beyond that of the general
public.”54  He differentiated himself from the general public by
noting that many people do not share his stated beliefs and “family
values.”55  At the same time, Ritchie alleged facts which, if proven,
would demonstrate that his injury was not unique to himself, thus
placing Ritchie squarely within “the zone of those with a real interest
in the registration.”56
                                                                
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Lipton Indus. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1029 (C.C.P.A.
1982)).
52. Id.
53. Ritchie I, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861 (citing Jewelers Vigilance Comm. Inc.
v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2021 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(determining a trade association’s standing to oppose a mark)).  This interpretation
of the rule was twice removed from the actual rule set forth in Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denying standing to public interest group that did not allege an
injury while filing opposition to proposed issuance, by government agency, of permit
to allow development of forest lands).  The Supreme Court in Sierra Club did not say
that the interest must be beyond that of the general public.  See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at
1095-96, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025-26 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding
in Sierra Club).  Rather, the Supreme Court recognized a trend “toward discarding
the notion that an injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury sufficient to
provide the basis for judicial review.”  Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738.  The Supreme
Court also stated that “the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by
the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process.”  Id. at 734.  The Court, however, premised the “injury
in fact test” on more than an injury to a mere cognizable interest; rather it required
“the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”  Id. at 735.  This is
apparently how the Federal Circuit in both Lipton and Jewelers misinterpreted the rule
regarding the “beyond that of the general public” requirement.  The Federal Circuit,
in rejecting reliance on Lipton and Jewelers in Ritchie II, noted that the statements
regarding the “beyond that of the general public” test in Lipton and Jewelers were
dicta only and indicated that neither case actually applied the test.  See Ritchie II, 170
F.3d at 1096, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026 (“Thus, the personal interest ‘beyond that
of the general public’ test was merely mentioned in the dicta of Jewelers and Lipton,
but was not actually applied in those cases.”).
54. Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1096, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026.
55. See id. at 1097, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (describing Ritchie’s alleged
injury resulting from the registration of the proposed mark).
56. See id. (citing Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176
(T.T.A.B. 1978) (discussing case where two women opposing the registration of the
mark “ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE
HAND” established standing because they had a “real interest” in the registration as
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The panel majority had difficulty seeing that Ritchie appropriately
distinguished himself from the general public, leading it to
unnecessarily question the origin of the “beyond that of the general
public” requirement.57  Therefore, the majority criticized the Board’s
ruling as an “overly constrictive interpretation” of the “real interest”
requirement.58
Ritchie described himself as a “family man who believes that the
sanctity of marriage requires a husband and wife who love and
nurture one another,” and alleged that the marks were “scandalous
because they would attempt to justify physical violence against
women.”59  The Federal Circuit held that the potential injury suffered
by Ritchie was the “disparagement of his alleged belief in a loving and
nurturing relationship between husband and wife,” and that if
Simpson’s marks were to register, he “would suffer an injury—
disparagement.”60  Therefore, the Court concluded that Ritchie met
the “real interest test.”61
                                                                
women)).
57. See id. at 1096-97, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026-27 (analyzing the history of
requiring a “real interest” in order to have standing).
58. See id. at 1097, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (noting that “[t]he crux of the
matter is not how many others share one’s belief that one will be damaged by the
registration, but whether that belief is reasonable and reflects a real interest in the
issue”).  In fact, the Federal Circuit further explained that “[o]n the contrary, the
purpose of the opposition proceeding is to establish what a substantial composite of
the general public believes.”  Id.  The Court described the Board’s error in requiring
the opposer to show that he does not share his interest with a large section of the
general public.  See id.
59. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id.  At least one problem with the majority’s reasoning, however, stems from
the fact that the Court apparently evaluated Ritchie’s opposition only under the
“scandalous” and “immoral” prongs of § 2(a) and not under the separate and distinct
“disparagement” ground.  See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1094, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1024 (discussing the court’s analysis under § 2 of the Lanham Act and utilizing the
“immoral” and “scandalous” language while the “disparagement” language is
conspicuously absent).  While the alleged disparagement of opposer’s beliefs
provides standing to proceed on the “disparagement” ground of § 2(a), it is
irrelevant to the “scandalous” and “immoral” grounds for opposition.  See In re Hines,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1686 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (noting that not every mark
found to be scandalous is disparaging),  rev’d on other grounds, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994); see also In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA)
1216, 1218, 1221 (T.T.A.B 1993) (indicating that there is little published precedent
to guide the court in determining whether a mark is “scandalous” under § 2(a), and
discussing the court’s finding that mark was scandalous was based largely on the
determination that mark was disparaging, but stating that by holding mark to be
scandalous here, does not “mean to suggest . . . that, in every case, a finding that
mark is scandalous subsumes, or is the same as, a finding of disparagement”).
Perhaps the Court and the parties were misled by misreading § 2(a) of the
Lanham Act.  The majority misinterpreted § 2(a) by overlooking critical language
and collapsing and combining the separate and distinct “disparagement” prong into
the “scandalous” prong:  “Under § 2 of the Lanham Act, a trademark that comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter which may disparage persons or beliefs is
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The majority fared better when it held that Ritchie satisfied the
“reasonable belief of damage” test.62  According to the majority, this
requirement is satisfied if the opposer “alleges that he possesses a
trait or characteristic that is clearly and directly implicated in the
proposed trademark.”63  Under circumstances in which no such
immutable trait or characteristic exists, the court determined that, to
have standing, the opposer must show he “is not alone in his belief of
damage, i.e., the belief is not simply the opposer’s subjective view.”64
Accordingly, after consideration of the evidence presented by
Ritchie, the majority concluded that his belief was reasonable, and
conferred standing.65
Judge Newman’s dissent suffered from many of the same
shortcomings propagated by the Board’s decision.66  Particularly
worth noting is the dissent’s concern that the majority created a
slippery slope by determining that Ritchie adequately pled his
standing to oppose the trademarks.67  The dissent distinguished
previous case law,68 stating that Ritchie’s interest was nothing more
                                                                
not entitled to registration.”  See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1098, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1028.  Perhaps the misinterpretation of § 2(a) derived from the fact that the court
omitted key language from § 2(a) when purporting to quote it by stating that the
question for the PTO to decide is whether the use of the questioned marks
“[c]onsists or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter which may disparage
or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute.”  Id. (emphasis added).
Omitted from the quoted statutory language was a semicolon and the phrase “or.”
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  The statute, in fact, reads:  “No
trademark . . . shall be refused registration . . . unless it . . . [c]onsists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest
. . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).
62. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1098, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 (discussing
Ritchie’s fulfillment of the “reasonable belief of damage test”).
63. See id. (illustrating by example the cases:  Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., 198
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176, 177 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (discussing suit where two women claimed
traits implicated in mark alleged to be offensive to women), and Harjo I, 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1830 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (addressing case where a group of
Native Americans alleged traits implicated in the mark “REDSKINS”)).
64. Id. (requiring that some showing, such as surveys or petitions, be presented
by the opposer to demonstrate that opposition is not based on a subjective view
alone, but on a reasonable belief that damage exists).
65. See id. (finding that Ritchie’s presentation of petitions from all across the
United States was “more than sufficient” to satisfy the reasonable belief of damage
test).  The court also emphasized that the PTO “may not readily assume, without
more, that they know the views of a substantial composite of the public” and that this
test “is a question of public perception, not private morals or even private conduct.”
Id. at 1098-99, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028-29.
66. See id. at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (questioning the dissent’s
understanding of the central issue in the case).
67. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (explaining how the panel majority’s opinion would allow an
“intermeddling public to burden commercial rights in which it has no interest”).
68. See id. at 1101, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031 (Newman, J., dissenting)
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than an assertion of moral preferences.69  By branding Ritchie with
pejorative terms such as “intermeddler,” and “self appointed
guardian of the register,”70 the dissent argued that Ritchie lacked
standing to oppose Simpson’s marks, because he failed to distinguish
himself from the population generally.71
Judge Newman’s interpretation is problematic because it would
read Section 1372 and Section 1473 directly out of the Lanham Act with
respect to oppositions and cancellations grounded in the “immoral”
or “scandalous” prongs of Section 2(a).74  It has been repeatedly held,
however, that a successful ex parte refusal or an opposition or
cancellation relying on the “scandalous” ground requires a showing
that the matter at issue is “offensive” or “shocking” to a “substantial
composite of the general public.”75  If someone from the general
population, who is personally shocked or offended by a mark, is
unable to challenge the registration of such a mark, who is left from
the “substantial composite of the general public” to object and
thereby give meaning to Section 13 and Section 14 of the Lanham
Act.
                                                                
(distinguishing Harjo I, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830, and Bromberg, 198 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 177, for purposes of illustrating that the respective opposers in each case
had interests in the marks, which they opposed beyond that of the general public).
69. See id. at 1102-03, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(referencing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985), for the
proposition that tribunals should “avoid deciding questions of broad social import
where no individual rights would be vindicated”).
70. Id. at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(introducing the dissent’s reasoning as to why Ritchie has not met the “minimal
statutory requirements” of 15 U.S.C. § 1063).
71. See id. at 1102, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(rejecting Ritchie’s standing claim).  Judge Newman based her reasoning on Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992), where the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that people who see elephants in the Bronx Zoo will be sufficiently injured and
have standing to challenge a development project funded by a federal agency in Sri
Lanka.  See id.
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (conferring standing before an
administrative agency in order for a litigant to oppose a mark).
73. See id. § 1064 (stating the grounds for a petition to cancel a registration of a
mark).
74. See id. § 1052(a) (providing that no mark will be registered if it “comprises
immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter”).
75. See, e.g., In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1370-75, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1923, 1925-29 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying “substantial composite” test and
holding that the evidence of record did not establish that proposed mark “BLACK
TAIL” would be offensive to a “substantial composite” of the general public); In re
McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485-87, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 668, 673-74 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
(applying “substantial composite” test to a proposed mark consisting of a photograph
of a nude man and woman kissing and finding that said mark was “scandalous” as
contemplated by the statute); In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 329, 37
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 268, 270 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (finding that registration of the mark
“MADONNA” for use on wine bottles would “be shocking to the sense of propriety of
nearly all who do not use wine as a beverage, and also to many who do so use it”).
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Judge Newman’s dissent also incorrectly concluded that Ritchie
failed to show an interest beyond that of the general public.76  As set
forth previously, Ritchie distinguished himself from those in the
general public who did not share his views and who were not
offended by the disputed marks.77  Whether Ritchie is able to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a “substantial
composite” of the general public agrees with him is another matter to
be addressed at the conclusion of the case.78  It must be remembered
that standing is only a threshold requirement.  Indeed, this author
believes that Ritchie will face an uphill battle on the merits because
the goods recited in Simpson’s applications do not include items
widely publicized as closely associated with the murder trials such as
knives, gloves, and knitted caps.79
C. Conflict of Federal Laws
The Federal Circuit decided, as a matter of first impression in
Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 80 that no conflict exists between a
Lanham Act federal unfair competition claim81 and the antitrust82 or
patent laws.83  Co-plaintiffs, Zenith Electronics Corporation
(“Zenith”) and Elo Touchsystems, Inc. (“Elo Touch”), brought a
patent infringement action against Exzec, Inc. (“Exzec”).84  In
defense, Exzec asserted:  Its actions were permissible under both
patent and antitrust laws, and that Elo Touch falsely stated to Exzec’s
potential customers that Exzec’s product infringed Elo Touch’s
patents and Exzec could not manufacture a similar product without
infringing Elo Touch’s patents.85
                                                                
76. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1101-02, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031-32 (Newman,
J., dissenting) (reasoning that the panel majority’s finding that Ritchie had
demonstrated a personal interest beyond that of the general public was inconsistent
with the vast weight of judicial authority).
77. See id. at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (holding that Ritchie had
standing).
78. See id. at 1098, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 (referring to the idea that marks
may offend a “substantial composite” of the general public even if they fail to
“implicate particular traits or characteristics”).
79. See Notice of Opposition, at 1-2, Ritchie I (PTO Opp. No. 101186) (listing the
intended use of the mark O.J. as provided in the Simpson application).
80. 182 F.3d 1340, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (referencing Federal Unfair
Competition provision of Lanham Act).
82. See id. § 2 (referencing penalties for monopolization of trade).
83. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (referencing infringement of
patents).
84. See Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1343, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (discussing Zenith’s
and Elo Touch’s suit, which relates to touch panel systems for computers, for patent
infringement against Exzec).
85. See id. at 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (describing Exzec’s argument on
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The district court determined that Exzec established a Section
43(a)86 unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act and a state
claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage,
and thus denied Elo Touch’s motion to dismiss the counterclaims.87
The district court, however, certified its order for immediate appeal
to the Federal Circuit88 to address the potential conflicts between
federal unfair competition and patent and antitrust laws.89
The district court’s concern regarding the Section 43(a) claim was
based on two cases, Pro-Mold and Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics90 and
Schreiber Foods v. Beatrice Cheese.91  In Pro-Mold, the Federal Circuit held
that the bad faith filing of a lawsuit, alleging patent infringement
while knowing that the patent is unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct, is not a valid Section 43(a) claim.92  The court held that
Section 43(a) “prohibits false designations of origin or false or
misleading descriptions of goods or services which are likely to cause
confusion.”93  Inequitable procurement of a patent, however, does
not fall under this rule.94  The Court also noted that adequate
                                                                
its motion to dismiss at the district court level).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
Any person who . . . uses in commerce . . . any . . . false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of his or her or another person’s goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”
Id.  See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 27:10, at 27-19 to 27-20 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing false advertising, trade libel, and
product disparagement claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
87. See Zenith, 183 F.3d at 1344, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (explaining the
district court’s reasoning in refusing the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the
counterclaims and motion for reconsideration).  Under the state law claim, a defense
of “privilege of competition” is available to those who act in good faith.  Id.
88. See id. at 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998), which allows for certification when the district court is “of
the opinion that [the] order involves a controlling question of law as to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of opinion”).
89. See id. (referencing Elo Touch’s immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit).
90. 75 F.3d 1568, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (deciding patent
dispute over a trading card holder).
91. No. 97-C-11, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22241 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 26, 1997)
(unpublished opinion).
92. See Pro-Mold, 75 F.3d at 1574-75, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631 (stating Great
Lakes’ allegation that Pro-Mold procured its patent by fraud in failing to disclose
evidence both of prior art and a joint inventor and, therefore, that its suit for patent
infringement was a bad faith claim).  Both the district court and the Federal Circuit
held that neither of these particular actions constituted inequitable conduct in that
case.  See id. at 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631 (affirming district court’s ruling
on the unfair competition and inequitable conduct claims).
93. Id. at 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631.
94. See id. (explaining the basis of a federal unfair competition claim under the
Lanham Act).
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remedies for inequitable patent procurement lie within both patent
law and antitrust law.95
In deciding Schreiber, the district court relied on the Federal
Circuit’s Pro-Mold decision.96  The Schreiber Court noted that the
underlying facts were different than those of Pro-Mold.97  Nevertheless,
the Schreiber Court found nothing in the Pro-Mold decision to indicate
that these two factual situations should be treated differently, and it
therefore dismissed the Section 43(a) claim.98
The Federal Circuit in Zenith, however, disagreed with the court in
Schreiber.99  It concluded that the factual difference between Schreiber
and Pro-Mold were significant.100  Specifically, the court distinguished
Pro-Mold from Zenith because in Zenith, Elo Touch made the alleged
misrepresentations in the marketplace rather than before the PTO.101
The Court stated that the patentee’s communication to the customers
was the key factor that triggered a Section 43(a) claim.102  The Court
also noted that the Pro-Mold court’s statements regarding the
availability of other remedial measures, aside from the Lanham Act,
did “not stat[e] a general principle for determining priority among
federal laws.”103
The Federal Circuit also distinguished Zenith from Concrete
Unlimited v. Cementcraft, Inc.104  In Concrete Unlimited, the Federal
Circuit reversed a district court’s decision that Concrete Unlimited
competed unfairly “by attempting to enforce its patent because it was
                                                                
95. See id. (stating that a “patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be
violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act”) (citations omitted).  “[T]here are adequate
remedies to deal with inequitable conduct when it is found.  Resort to federal unfair
competition law is not one of them [sic].” Id.
96. See Schreiber Foods, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22241, at *16-21.
97. See id. at *17-19 (noting that Pro-Mold did not involve allegations that the
patentee sent letters to the customers of the other party asserting its patent rights as
well as threatening litigation).
98. See id. at *18 (“Nothing in Pro-Mold indicated that such a distinction would
alter the result.”).
99. See Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346 (disapproving of
the Schreiber court’s choice to equate the filing of a bad faith patent infringement
lawsuit and the sending of patent infringement notices to the claimant’s customers
in applying § 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
100. See id. (noting that the significant difference lay in the fact that the filing of
an infringement suit is “clearly not covered by the text of 43(a)”).
101. See id. (stating that in making the distinction as to what types of claims may be
brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act “[t]he gravamen of Exzec’s claim [was]
marketplace misconduct, not abuse of the administrative and judicial process”).
102. See id. (rejecting the application of a § 43(a) unfair competition claim based
on marketplace misconduct to the filing of a bad faith patent infringement law suit).
103. Id. at 1349-50, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346-47.
104. 776 F.2d 1537, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 784 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the
patent claims were invalid, but that the patent holder did not engage in unfair
competition by enforcing patent rights during course of litigation).
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fraudulently obtained.”105  Concrete Unlimited, however, never made
any marketplace assertions of infringement regarding its patent, so
the case was clearly distinguishable from Zenith.106
After discussing the previous case law, the Federal Circuit in Zenith
looked to each area of law to determine whether any conflicts arose
between Section 43(a) claims and antitrust or patent law claims.107
The court held that no conflict exists between federal unfair
competition and antitrust laws in this situation and briefly offered two
reasons.108  First, both laws share a common purpose:  “fostering fair
and unfettered competition.”109  Second, the elements of the two
claims are “substantially different,” and recognizing both causes of
action “will in no way thwart the congressional purpose” of the two
laws.110
The Federal Circuit recognized a greater conflict between the
nature of the unfair competition claim at issue in the Zenith case and
the patent law.111  The notion that a patentee may assert its patent
rights publicly is based in both the statute112 and case law.113  In
resolving this conflict, the Zenith Court adopted a bad faith
requirement, developed initially to address the tension between
patent laws’ assertion and antitrust laws’ rejection of monopoly
powers.114  The court reasoned:  “[I]mposing § 43(a) liability on a
                                                                
105. Id. at 1539, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 785 (stating that Concrete Unlimited
acted properly when it sought to enforce its patent rights prior to the pending
adjudication finding the patent invalid).
106. See Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1350, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344-45 (emphasizing
the difference between threatened patent infringement litigation and market-based
actions).
107. See id. at 1351-55, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346-48 (analyzing separately
antitrust and patent law provisions).
108. See id. at 1352-53, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346 (finding that allowing Exzec
to pursue a § 43(a) claim on the implicated facts would not conflict with “the
purpose and scope” of antitrust law).
109. Id. (referencing Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 327, 331 (1985) (stating that Congress passed the Lanham Act to
“foster competition”)).
110. See id. at 1352, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346 (explaining that a Sherman
claim requires “identification of the relevant market and establishment of monopoly
power in that market,” unlike a § 43(a) claim).
111. See id.
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (allowing patent holders to
“give notice to the public that the [article] is patented” by affixing either “patent” or
“pat.” with the appropriate number upon the article).
113. See Concrete Unlimited v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1539, 227
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 784, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasizing a “patent owner has the
right to . . . enforce its patent, and that includes threatening alleged infringers with
suit”).
114. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 992-96 (9th Cir. 1979)
(creating a rebuttable presumption of good faith in patent infringement suits in
order to undermine the potential for bad faith infringement claims intended
primarily to further monopoly control).
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patentee for marketplace statements regarding infringement and
scope of its patent . . . does not impermissibly conflict with the patent
laws as long as the statements are proven to have been made in bad faith.”115
The imposition of liability, however, requires those statements to
meet the elements of Section 43(a).116  The Federal Circuit further
justified the introduction of a bad faith requirement, stating:  “patent
law is not frustrated because bad faith marketplace statements
concerning patents do not further the purposes of the patent law.”117
In Zenith, the court focused specifically on two statements made by
Elo Touch:  (1) Exzec infringed Zenith’s patents; and (2) the very
nature of the product made production of a noninfringing product
impossible.118  Those statements, if made in bad faith, may be
actionable under Section 43(a).119  In addition, the Court provided
further guidance in determining conduct that may constitute bad
faith:
[I]f the patentee knows that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or
not infringed, yet represents to the marketplace that a competitor
is infringing the patent, a clear case of bad faith representations is
made out.  Furthermore, statements to the effect that a competitor
is incapable of designing around the patent are inherently
suspect . . . [since] it is likely that most patents can be designed
around [and] because such a statement appears nearly impossible
to confirm a priori.120
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial
of Elo Touch’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case.121
                                                                
115. Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (emphasis added).
116. See id. at 1347-48, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342-43 (stating the elements of
§ 43(a)):
[T]he plaintiff . . . must allege and ultimately prove:  (1) that the
defendant . . . made a false or misleading statement of fact in commercial
advertising or promotion about the plaintiff’s goods or services; (2) that the
statement actually deceives or is likely to deceive a substantial segment of the
intended audience; (3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to
influence purchasing decisions; (4) that the defendant caused the statement
to enter interstate commerce; and (5) that the statement results in actual or
probable injury to the plaintiff.
Id.
117. Id. at 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.  See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 678 (1974) (articulating
patent law objectives as balancing “right of exclusion” against eventual full disclosure
in order to promote scientific and economic progress).
118. See Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
119. See id. (asserting statements made in bad faith hinder competition, thus
deserving no protection under the patent laws).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1355-56, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
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D. Choice of Law
The Federal Circuit often determines which substantive law is
applicable.122  Depending on the nature of the issue to be decided,
the Federal Circuit may apply its own growing body of substantive law
or may place itself in the role of the appropriate regional circuit
Court of Appeals.123  As the 1999 cases reveal, the Federal Circuit does
not shy away from reversing lower court decisions, even in the latter
type of case.124
1. Other non-patent issues in patent cases
In Riggs Marketing v. Mitchell,125 the Federal Circuit followed its own
law in deciding both substantive and procedural patent law issues, but
followed the general rule of applying the law of the appropriate
circuit to the non-patent law issues.126  In Riggs, the plaintiff, Riggs
Marketing (“Riggs”) sought a declaratory judgment of patent non-
infringement.127  In response, the defendants, Edward Mitchell and
Mitchell Golf Equipment Company (collectively “Mitchell”)
counterclaimed for patent infringement.128  Subsequently, Riggs
amended its complaint to include a claim for trademark
infringement.129  The Federal Circuit applied Ninth Circuit trademark
law and reversed the district court’s decision to deny Mitchell’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law.130
                                                                
122. See Comair Rotron v. Matsushita Elec., 31 F.3d 1177, No. 93-1410, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18325, at *4, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785, 1787 (Fed. Cir. July 19, 1994)
(unpublished table decision) (stating that the Federal Circuit reviews de novo
application of substantive law).
123. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1288-89, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reviewing the district court’s
imposition of a sanction under the circuit’s law); Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory
Assocs., 772 F.2d 1557, 1567, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 84 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reviewing
trial court’s ruling of summary judgement under Oregon law).
124. See infra Part I.D.1-2 and accompanying notes (discussing non-patent issues in
patent cases and preemption and conflict of law issues).
125. See Nos. 98-1507, 98-1551, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11862, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June
8, 1999) (affirming lower court’s finding of patent noninfringement, but reversing
finding that plaintiff’s mark had acquired secondary meaning).
126. See id. at *8 (citing Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, 175 F.3d 1356, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (applying Federal Circuit law to
reverse patent issue and instructing district court to apply Iowa law on trade dress
issue)).
127. See id. at *3-4.
128. See id. at *2-3 (addressing U.S. Patent 4,620,431 for “STEELCLUB®” golf club
bending machine to which Mitchell is licensee).
129. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.3 for factual discussion of Riggs Marketing and the
Federal Circuit’s substantive holding.
130. See Riggs Mktg., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11862, at *1-2 (affirming jury’s finding
of patent noninfringement by Riggs, but reversing jury’s finding that Riggs’s
trademark possessed secondary meaning as unsupportable).
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In Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International,131 the Federal Circuit applied the
Eleventh Circuit’s law for “trademark and trade dress infringement,
which are not unique to [the Federal Circuit’s] jurisdiction.”132  Al-
Site Corporation, now Magnivision, Inc. (“Magnivision”), sued VSI
International, Inc. (“VSI”), asserting infringement of its
“MAGNIVISION” word mark and its trade dress of (1) display cards
and blister packs, (2) a color-coding scheme, and (3) eyeglass styles
and colors.133
Applying Eleventh Circuit law,134 the Federal Circuit reversed the
jury finding of trade dress infringement.135  Under Eleventh Circuit
law, inherent distinctiveness turns on whether the trade dress
presents:
[A] ‘common’ basic shape or design, whether it [is] unique or
unusual in a particular field, [and] whether it [is] a mere
refinement of a commonly adopted and well-known form of
ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public
as a dress or ornamentation for the goods.136
Magnivision offered only its sole use of the trade dress as evidence
of distinctiveness.137  The Federal Circuit, relying on its color mark
precedent,138 stated that sole use evidence presents only a
                                                                
131. 174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172; see also Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v.
Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568, 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1631 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“When considering issues which are not unique to our jurisdiction we defer
to the law of the regional circuit.”); United States Phillips Corp. v. Windmere Corp.,
861 F.2d 695, 702, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“We apply the
law of the regional circuit in which the district court sits to determine . . . the
antitrust law questions”).
133. See Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1327-30, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173-75 (reversing
district court’s finding of infringement upon display cards/blister packs, color-
coding scheme, eyeglass style/colors and word mark).
134. See id. at 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (requiring plaintiff to show:
“(1) the inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning of its trade dress, (2) the
essential nonfunctionality of its trade dress, and (3) the likelihood of consumer
confusion as to origin, sponsorship, or approval due to similarity between its and the
defendant’s trade dress”).  See generally Wal-Mart Stores v. Samare Bros., 120 S. Ct.
1339, 1343-44, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (2000) (holding product
configuration trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive as a matter of law and may
only receive protection upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness, i.e., secondary
meaning).
135. See Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1328-30, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174-75 (discussing
(1) the lack of distinctiveness and (2) the inherent functionality of Magnivision’s
color scheme).
136. Id. at 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (quoting AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,
812 F.2d 1531, 1536, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1178 (11th Cir. 1986) (ruling Kraft’s
ice-cream wrapper infringed upon trade dress of AmBrit’s wrapper) (alterations in
original)).
137. See id. at 1327, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (rejecting Magnivision’s claim as
unpersuasive as Magnivision utilized the trade dress for only two years).
138. See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 774 F.2d 1116, 1125, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
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“preliminary step for a descriptive trade dress to acquire
distinctiveness and secondary meaning.”139  Although the Federal
Circuit noted that a showing of secondary meaning could establish a
distinctive trade dress,140 the court found insufficient evidence to
show secondary meaning of the display cards and blister packs.141  The
Court, interestingly, never specifically applied the test of inherent
distinctiveness set forth by the Eleventh Circuit,142 but concluded
without discussion that the claimed display card/blister pack trade
dress was not inherently distinctive.143
The Federal Circuit also reversed the jury’s finding that VSI
infringed Magnivision’s color-coding system.144  Writing for the court,
Judge Rader held that color alone, absent secondary meaning,
cannot be inherently distinctive.145  Further, the Court held
Magnivision failed to establish that its color scheme was distinctive or
indicative of its source; rather, the scheme was primarily functional.146
Magnivision employed the color scheme to indicate the diopter
strength of its eyeglasses, an unprotected functional aspect.147
Therefore, no trademark infringement occurred.148
Applying Eleventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit also held that
Magnivision did not possess trade dress rights in its eyeglass styles
because those styles were produced using publicly-available molds.149
                                                                
417, 422 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“An evidentiary showing of secondary meaning . . .
includes evidence of the trademark owner’s method of using the mark,
supplemented by evidence of the effectiveness of such use to cause the purchasing
public to identify the mark with the source of the product.”).
139. See Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1327, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (undercutting
Magnivision’s argument to be the only company to use a particular design before
being copied).
140. See id. at 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (recognizing as consumer link
between mark and producer).
141. See id. at 1328, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (describing substantial
difference in color and graphics for each party’s packaging).
142. See supra text accompanying note 136 (describing the Eleventh Circuit’s test
for inherent distinctiveness).
143. See Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1327-28, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173-74.
144. See id. at 1329, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174-75 (detailing the primarily
functional nature of plaintiff’s color-coding system); cf. id. at 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1175 (explaining the requirements plaintiff must establish to prove trade
dress infringement).
145. See id. at 1328, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (citing Qualitex v. Jacobson
Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) “[O]ver time, customers may come to treat a
particular color on a product or its packaging . . . as signifying brand.”).
146. See id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d 1081, 1086 (1992) (defining functional as “one of a limited number of
equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition would be
unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection”).
147. See id. at 1329, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (stating that no reasonable juror
could have found for Magnivision given functional nature of color-coding scheme).
148. See id. (reversing the district court’s ruling as an abuse of discretion).
149. See id. at 1329-30, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (indicating both parties
BAIRDJCI.DOC 6/19/2001  10:51 AM
2000] 1999 TRADEMARK DECISIONS 1343
Lastly, the Court determined that no trademark infringement existed
between the “MAGNIVION” mark and VSI’s disputed
“MAGNA.DOT” mark, because:  (1) the marks were sufficiently
different, preventing consumer confusion during several years of co-
existing use;150 (2) VSI did not possess an intent to copy;151 and (3) the
widespread use of “magna” or “magni”152 significantly weakened
Magnivision’s claim.153
2. Deciding preemption and conflict of laws issues
The Federal Circuit, in Midwest Industries v. Karavan Trailers,154
determined that it would apply its own law when deciding whether
patent law preempts any state laws and when resolving a conflict
between federal laws.155  Midwest Industries (“Midwest”) claimed that
Karavan Trailers (“Karavan”) infringed its design patents and trade
dress rights in the design of its curved winch posts for its watercraft
trailers.156  The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
apparently finding no applicable Eighth Circuit law to follow, based
its decision to grant Karavan’s motion to dismiss for the trade dress
claims157 on Tenth Circuit law.158
In reaching this new rule, the Federal Circuit overruled its previous
precedent,159 which required the application of regional circuit law
“to conflicts between patent law and other legal rights.”160  The
Federal Circuit distinguished between patent issues and non-patent
issues by applying Federal Circuit law to the former and regional
                                                                
utilized publicly available molds).
150. See id. at 1330, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (reasoning that the marks at
issue “do not present a similar sound, meaning, or commercial impression”).
151. See id. at 1330-31, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176 (noting absence of evidence
of intent on record).
152. Id. at 1330, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176 (describing wide uses of common
descriptive terms “magna” or “magni” throughout eyeglass industry).
153. See id. at 1330-31, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
154. 175 F.3d 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
155. See id. at 1358-59, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75 (overruling prior practice
of applying circuit law to questions between patent law and other state or federal
laws).
156. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1357, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
157. See id. at 1358, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
158. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1342 (10th Cir. 1995) (preventing protection under trade
dress law for products incorporating aspects of utility patents).
159. See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, 770 F.2d 1015, 1029, 1033, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881, 890, 892-93 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying regional circuit law);
Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 128 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (same); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v Harmonic Design, 153 F.3d 1318, 1333, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1780 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1143
(1999).
160. Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1358-59, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75.
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circuit law to the latter.161  In guiding its determination whether an
issue was a “patent” or “non-patent” issue, the Federal Circuit applied
its own law only to an issue that “pertain[s] to patent law,”162 “bears an
essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive control
by statute,”163 or “clearly implicates the jurisprudential responsibilities
of this court in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction.”164  Applying
these three principals, however, the Federal Circuit has gradually
applied its own law to an increasingly wide variety of issues.165
In recognizing this jurisdictional expansion, the Court stated, “our
responsibility as the tribunal having sole appellate responsibility for
the development of patent law requires that we do more than simply
apply our law to questions of substantive patent law.”166  The court
reasoned:
If we simply follow regional circuit law in deciding questions
involving the interaction between patent law principles and other
legal remedies, other courts will not have the benefit of our analysis
of the substance and scope of patent law in such cases.  Such
abdication, we think, would in the end disserve the interest in
attaining coherence and consistency in the law relating to
patents.167
Applying its own law, the court then reversed the district court’s
                                                                
161. See id. at 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (citing Atari v. JS & A Group,
747 F.2d 1422, 1440, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(applying Seventh Circuit law to deny transfer from Federal Circuit to Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals)).
162. Id. (quoting Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 &
n.14, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 471 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
163. Id. (quoting Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, 946 F.2d 850, 859, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
164. Id. (quoting Gardco Mfg. v. Herst Lighting, 820 F.2d 1209, 1212, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2015, 2018 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
165. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564, 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (determining whether the district
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a patent suit); Hybritech, Inc. v.
Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 & n.12, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1195 & n.12
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (deciding whether plaintiff has a right to a preliminary injunction);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 954-55 & n.3, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1311 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (deciding whether to allow an
alleged infringer to bring a declaratory action); Gardco, 820 F.2d at 1212, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (deciding whether patentee is entitled to
a jury trial); Truswal Sys. v. Hydro-Air Eng’g, 813 F.2d 1207, 1212, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (deciding discovery issues in patent cases).
166. Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1360, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675-76.  In
pronouncing this new standard, the court considered two cases, Pro-Mold & Tool Co.
v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568, 1574, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1631 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (applying federal circuit law to determine whether unfair competition is
foreclosed by patent law), and Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059,
1067-68, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(determining whether a patentee is subject to antitrust liability).
167. Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
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grant of partial summary judgment that foreclosed Midwest’s trade
dress claims and remanded the case for further proceedings.168
Further, the Federal Circuit instructed the lower court to “conduct an
inquiry into functionality in order to determine whether Midwest’s
curved winch post is entitled to protection as trade dress under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”169  Given the United States Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,170 the
lower court also would be well-advised to “conduct an inquiry” into
whether Midwest’s claimed product configuration trade dress in the
curved winch post has acquired distinctiveness, because it cannot be
inherently distinctive as a matter of law.171
E. Appeals
1. Appeals from Commissioner’s decisions
In The Pep Boys Manny v. Cherng Lian Ent Co.,172 the Federal Circuit
dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks (the “Commissioner”) ruling against the Pep Boys’
(“Pep”) opposition action.173  Pep claimed dilution as one of two
possible bases for opposing Cherng Lian Ent Co., Ltd.’s (“Cherng
Lian”) proposed mark.174  The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(the “Board”), however, dismissed the claim of trademark dilution
“on the ground that such a claim could not form the basis of an
opposition to registration.”175  As a result, Pep petitioned the
                                                                
168. See id. at 1364, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (concluding that “the fact that a
curved winch post was disclosed and claimed in the ‘261 patent is not a sufficient
basis for granting judgment against Midwest on the state law claims”).
169. Id.
170. 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1070 (2000) (holding that
unregistered product configuration trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive as a
matter of law).
171. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069 (concluding that design, like color,
cannot be inherently distinctive because consumers are not predisposed to relate
design to producer).
172. 215 F.3d 1342, No. 99-1271, 1999 WL 595145 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 1999)
(unpublished table decision).
173. See id. at *1 (holding that not every decision made by the Commissioner is
automatically appealable to the Federal Circuit).
174. See id. (noting that in addition to dilution, Pep also opposed Cherng Lian’s
trademark registration due to an alleged likelihood of confusion); see also supra Part
I.C for a discussion of the Board’s dismissal based on dilution.
175. See Pep Boys, 1999 WL 595145, at *1 (denying Pep’s dilution claim on the
ground that such claim did not qualify as an appropriate opposition per the Board’s
standards); see also Babson Bros. v. Surge Power Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953,
1954 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (interpreting the Lanham Act to prohibit dilution as a possible
basis for opposition).  This Board’s decision led Congress to amend the Lanham Act
to broaden the possible bases for opposition and cancellation.  See infra note 180 and
accompanying text.
BAIRDJCI.DOC 6/19/2001  10:51 AM
1346 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1321
Commissioner to vacate the Board’s order.176  The Commissioner
dismissed Pep’s petition as an improper subject for relief because it
related to a substantive decision of the Board, and not a decision
based on rules or practice set by the Commissioner.177  Pep also had
claimed the Commissioner’s decision was appealable as a collateral
order according to Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.178  The Federal
Circuit, however, rejected this argument because the issue in Cohen
was whether a decision by a federal court was final, while the issue in
Pep Boys was whether a Commissioner’s decision could be directly
appealed to the Federal Circuit.179
It is worth noting that the Federal Circuit decided this case before
a 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act, which expressly provides for
dilution as a new basis for oppositions and cancellations.180  Section 2
of the Lanham Act now reads, in pertinent part:
A mark which when used would cause dilution under section 43(c)
may be refused registration only pursuant to a[n opposition]
proceeding brought under section 13.  A registration for a mark
which when used would cause dilution under section 43(c) may be
cancelled pursuant to a proceeding brought under either section
14 or section 24 [cancellation proceeding against Principal and
Supplemental Registrations, respectively].181
With the above amendment to the Lanham Act, the Board must
                                                                
176. See Pep Boys, 1999 WL 595145, at *1 (arguing that dilution could form the
basis of an opposition to Cherng Lian’s registration).
177. See id. (finding that substantive decisions by the Board should not be vacated
by Commissioner, but instead should be considered through an appeal).
178. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  In Cohen, the Supreme Court held that a federal court’s
order applying state law was appealable because it:
[F]all[s] in that small class [of non-final actions] which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.
Id. at 546.  Thus, the lower court’s order based on state law was “appealable because
it is a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of
action and does not require consideration with it.”  See id. at 546-47.
179. See Pep Boys, 1999 WL 595145, at *1.  The court stated, “The issue is not
whether the Commissioner’s decision should be deemed final under the Cohen
analysis; the issue is whether the Commissioner’s decision is reviewable by this court
on direct appeal at this time.”  Id. (citing In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 869, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that not every Commissioner’s
decision is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit),
and In re Makari, 708 F.2d 709, 711, 218 U.S.P.Q. 193, 194 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding
that United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction
to review Commissioner’s decisions on petitions)).
180. See Pub. L. No. 106-43, § 2, 113 Stat. 218, 218 (1999) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1052) (amending the Trademark Act of 1946 with regards to dilution of
famous marks).
181. Id.
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now entertain, and the Federal Circuit must review, oppositions and
cancellations based on the new ground of dilution of a famous mark.
2. Interlocutory appeals
Upon request to hear issues of first impression regarding the newly
passed Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act,182 a majority
panel of the Federal Circuit held in Amp Plus, Inc. v. Juno Lighting,
Inc.183 that if a district court certifies an order to the Federal Circuit,
the Federal Circuit still has complete discretion concerning whether
to hear the case.184  The majority emphasized that it is within the
court’s sole discretion to grant or deny permission to appeal an
interlocutory order.185
The Federal Circuit simply chose not to hear the case because it
would have had to apply Ninth Circuit law.186  This is curious
reasoning, to say the least, because the Federal Circuit’s 1999
trademark decisions, Riggs Marketing187 and Al-Site Corp.,188
demonstrate the court’s comfort not only in applying regional circuit
law, but in reversing lower court determinations by purporting to
apply regional circuit law.189
Indeed, dissenting Circuit Judge Pauline Newman stated in Amp
Plus that applying regional circuit law is not a sufficient reason to
deny an interlocutory appeal, because the Federal Circuit has
previously reviewed such cases.190  Judge Newman’s dissenting opinion
                                                                
182. See Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing guidelines for the protection and
registration of commercial trademarks).
183. 194 F.3d 1337, Nos. 581, 582, 1999 WL 426393 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 1999)
(unpublished table decision) .
184. See id. at *1 (citing In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Pat. Litig., 903 F.2d
822, 822, 12 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1559, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding the court’s
discretion to grant or deny permission to appeal is comparable to the Supreme
Court’s discretion to grant or deny an application for writ of certiorari).
185. See id. (noting that “the court may deny application to appeal without
specifying the grounds for basis of denial”).
186. See id. (implying that the Federal Circuit should refrain from the application
of regional circuit law regardless of the issues before the court).
187. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 131-37, 139-57 and
accompanying text.
189. See supra Part I.D.1 and accompanying notes (discussing the application of
circuit law to non-patent law issues).
190. See Amp Plus, 1999 WL 426393, at *2 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Philips
Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592, 596, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699, 1702
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying Seventh Circuit law in deciding judicial estoppel and
collateral estoppel issues); Picker Int’l v. Varian Assocs., 869 F.2d 578, 580-81, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying Sixth and Tenth Circuit law
in deciding issue of attorney disqualification); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
867 F.2d 1415, 1419 & n.11, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1877, 1880 & n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(applying First Circuit law in determining the permissibility of a motion to vacate in
BAIRDJCI.DOC 6/19/2001  10:51 AM
1348 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1321
stressed, to no avail, that as a consequence of the majority ruling, the
district court could not certify the questions to any other circuit court
because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal of
the entire case, making the denial of an interlocutory appeal
especially unfair to the movant.191
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc.192 the Federal Circuit
maintained jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal despite the fact
that the district court entered a joint stipulation and proposed order
dismissing the patent claims with prejudice.193  “The path of appeal is
determined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district court, and is not
controlled by the district court’s decision or the substance of issues
that are appealed.”194  The court also noted that a dismissal of a
patent infringement claim “without prejudice” is considered an
amendment of the complaint,195 while a dismissal “with prejudice”
constitutes an adjudication on the merits.196  Thus, the Federal Circuit
only maintains jurisdiction over cases in which the dismissal is “with
prejudice.”197
                                                                
conjunction with disqualification of trial judge); Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1337, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1424, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (applying Second Circuit law in deciding issue of attorney disqualification);
United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 992 & n.4, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1307,
1309 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying Second Circuit law in deciding an issue
concerning compelled discovery); Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory Assocs., 772
F.2d 1557, 1566, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying Ninth Circuit
law in deciding issue of attorney disqualification)).
191. See Amp Plus, 1999 WL 426393, at *2 (“Our refusal to do so diminishes the
opportunity of all district courts to dispense even-handed procedural justice to the
non-patent issues that arise in patent litigation.”).
192. 182 F.3d 1340, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  See Part I.C,
which discusses, in general, conflicts of law and specifically the underlying facts of
this case.
193. See id. at 1346, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (concluding that the Court’s
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal was permissible pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(1) and § 1295(a)(1)).
194. Id. (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349-50, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1192, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added).
195. See id. (relying on Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 518, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1987), in which the court, having dismissed
“without prejudice” a patent infringement claim, thereby leaving a trade secret claim,
characterized such dismissal as an amendment to the complaint).
196. See id., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (referring to Hartley v. Mentor Corp.,
869 F.2d 1469, 1473, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1989), in which the
court determined that the dismissal of a patent validity claim “with prejudice”
functioned as an adverse judgment on the merits).
197. See id. (finding that in a case where the dismissal is “with prejudice,” the
issues of the case remain undisturbed and the Federal Circuit retains exclusive
jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (establishing the
path of appeal).
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADDRESSES SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A substantial share of the Federal Circuit’s 1999 trademark
decisions involved significant rulings concerning the substance of
trademark law.  The court addressed an interesting mix of substantive
issues, including fraud on the PTO, phantom marks, distinctiveness,
genericness, descriptiveness, secondary meaning, functionality,
likelihood of confusion, gray-market goods, and the First
Amendment.198
A. Federal Registration
In dealing with the issue of federal registration, the Federal Circuit
analyzed two types of statements that were used by opponents to
attempt cancellation on the ground of fraud.199  In addition, in one of
the more interesting decisions in 1999, the court rendered a forceful
decision to prohibit the registration of phantom marks.200
1. Fraud upon the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
According to Section 14 of the Lanham Act, a federal trademark
registration—even an incontestable one—may be cancelled at any
time if it was obtained “fraudulently.”201  “Fraud in procuring a . . .
mark occurs when an applicant knowingly makes false, material
representations of fact in connection with an application.”202  Making
a false statement, however, is not sufficient.203  There must be an
intent to deceive the PTO.204  Because challenges based on fraud are
so often and easily pled, the bar has been set at a level where it has
been proven to be difficult to establish, requiring clear and
convincing evidence of the fraud.205
                                                                
198. See infra Parts II-IV and accompanying notes (discussing these issues).
199. See infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying notes (addressing statements
regarding exclusivity of use and statements concerning pending proceedings).
200. See infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes (addressing prohibition against
registration of phantom marks).
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (detailing the circumstances,
including obtainment through fraud, in which a petition for cancellation of
trademark registration may be filed).
202. Metro Traffic Control v. Shadow Network, 104 F.3d 336, 340, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (concerning an attempt by a corporation to
prevent a competitor from registering a broadcast service mark which it alleged the
competitor procured fraudulently).
203. See id. at 340-41, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373 (finding the false statement
made by the competitor arose due to a lack of clarity concerning the legal
implications of those statements, not due to a fraudulent intent).
204. See id. (noting that unless clear and convincing evidence of an intent to
defraud is proven, cancellation for fraudulent obtainment of registration is
unwarranted).
205. See id. at 341, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373 (distinguishing an intent to
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a. Statements of exclusivity of use
Enhancing the protection afforded owners of federal trademark
registrations, the Federal Circuit in L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc.206
established a difficult standard to obtain cancellation of a registered
mark as a result of Section 2(f) fraud.207  The Federal Circuit reversed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment that had ordered
cancellation of the trademark registration of L.D. Kichler Co.’s
(“Kichler”) trademark for a “racetrack backplate” on the ground of
fraud.208  Unlike most backplates, devices used for mounting light
fixtures on the wall, Kichler’s “racetrack backplate” was ovular rather
than rectangular.209  The PTO registered the trade dress with a
Section 2(f) declaration indicating that Kichler had “substantially
exclusive and continuous” use of the trade dress for five years.210  At
that time, however, Kichler was aware that at least three other
companies, including defendant Quorum International (“Quorum”),
sold similar backplates.211  When Kichler sued Quorum for trademark
infringement, Quorum filed a counterclaim for cancellation.212
The Federal Circuit held that the lower court misinterpreted a rule
earlier pronounced by the Federal Circuit, which had stated:
“[w]hen the record shows that purchasers are confronted with more
than one (let alone numerous) independent users of a term or
device, an application for registration under Section 2(f) cannot be
successful.”213  The Court pointed out that when this rule is read in
                                                                
deceive, which is characterized by a misrepresentation willfully and knowingly carried
out, from a false statement, which results from an honest mistake or negligence).
206. 192 F.3d 1349, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Kichler II).
207. See Kichler II, 192 F.3d at 1351, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 (holding that to
obtain cancellation of a trademark registration, the movant must not only show that
the use of the mark was not ‘substantially exclusive and continuous,’ but also must
provide clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party possessed the intent
to deceive the PTO through its misrepresentations).
208. See id. at 1350, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308 (finding that the lower court
should have considered fraud and functionality issues in its determination of
whether summary judgement was appropriate).
209. See id. at 1351, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308 (noting that Kichler’s exclusive
use of the oval design became contested when it sued defendant Quorum, because of
Quorum’s use of a “Cobblestone” finish on its backplates, which according to Kichler
was “confusingly similar” to its own backplate color, “Olde Brick”).
210. See id. (establishing the standard for trademark registration as set forth in the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
211. See id. (raising the issue as to whether Kichler’s trademark application for its
oval backplate was legitimate despite its knowledge of the production of similar
backplates by other manufacturers).
212. See id. at 1351, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (arguing that Kichler’s § 2(f)
filing was fraudulently inaccurate and therefore void).
213. See id. at 1352, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 1403, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 939, 940-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(finding that a mark for a shoe tab could not be registered because of the
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context, the Section 2(f) standard includes “substantially exclusive and
continuous use” of a mark for five years.214  Because the lower court
did not consider the extent or substantiality of the other companies’
sales of similar backplates, it could not properly determine whether
Kichler’s use was “substantially exclusive,” despite the other
companies’ possibly “inconsequential” use.215
Separate from the lower court’s above-cited deficiency, it also failed
to support the summary cancellation with another required finding;
whether Davoil, the named defendant, had established that Kichler
intended to deceive the PTO.216  The lower court failed entirely to
address the issue of intent, causing the Federal Circuit to remand the
case for a determination of “whether there existed significant prior
use by others, and if so, whether Kichler knowingly submitted a false
declaration with an intent to deceive.”217
b. Statements concerning pending proceedings
In Sunrise Jewelry Manufacturing  Corp. v. Fred S.A.,218 Sunrise Jewelry
Manufacturing Corp. (“Sunrise”) sought to cancel Fred S.A.’s
(“Fred”) registration for a claimed trade dress, which was described
as a “metallic nautical rope design” for clocks, watches, and jewelry.219
Sunrise sought cancellation on two grounds:  genericness of Fred’s
trade dress220 and fraud upon the PTO.221  The Board refused to
cancel the mark on either ground.222  The Federal Circuit affirmed
                                                                
“significant prior use of such tabs by other companies”)).
214. See id. (explaining that use need not be wholly exclusive such that registration
claim may still be filed if use by others is inconsequential).
215. See id. (concluding that the lower court’s failure to consider the extent of the
other companies’ sales was in itself grounds to reverse summary judgment, because
this determination represented a material issue of fact).
216. See id. (relying on the standard established in Metro Traffic Control v. Shadow
Network, 104 F.3d 336, 340, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which
required a showing of fraudulent intent for cancellation of registration).
217. See id. (confirming that only when determinations are made concerning prior
use by others and intent to deceive the PTO through a false application, is
cancellation of a trademark registration appropriate).
218. 175 F.3d 1322, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
219. See id. at 1323, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (noting that the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board had previously dismissed the petition to cancel Fred’s
registration).
220. See id. (leading the court to conclude that “the registration of an
incontestable mark that is a product design may be cancelled if the mark is
generic”); see also infra Part II.B.1.b for further discussion of the facts and the Federal
Circuit’s analysis of the trade dress issue.
221. See Sunrise Jewelery, 175 F.3d at 1327, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 (relying on
the standards set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994), which prohibit fraud against
the PTO).
222. See id. at 1323, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (finding that “Sunrise’s
pleadings of fraud were legally insufficient,” and that “Fred’s trademark could not be
challenged as generic due to its incontestable status”).
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the Board’s decision dismissing the petition to cancel the trademark
on grounds of fraud.223
To properly understand Sunrise’s claim of fraud, the factual
background must be explained more thoroughly.  The PTO
registered Fred’s trade dress on February 27, 1990.224  In March 1993,
two companies, Al-Or International (“Al-Or”) and Philippe Charriol
International (“Charriol”) filed a declaratory judgment action,
arguing that its trade dress did not infringe Fred’s registered mark.225
They also filed with the PTO a Petition to Cancel the federally
registered trade dress.226  The parties settled the dispute, dismissed
the litigation on April 19, 1995, and withdrew the cancellation
proceeding on May 8, 1995.227  Simultaneously, the three parties
joined as plaintiffs and filed complaints against a number of
defendants for infringement of the trade dress.228  On May 8, 1995,
Fred filed its Section 15 affidavit for incontestability, stating that
there was “no proceeding involving the rights pending and not
disposed of either in the PTO or in the courts.”229  On June 25, 1995,
the PTO acknowledged the dismissal of the cancellation proceeding,
and the new defendants filed a counterclaim to the complaint to
declare the trade dress invalid.230  The PTO acknowledged Fred’s
Section 15 affidavit on March 18, 1996.231  Sunrise Jewelry filed its
petition to cancel on June 5, 1995.232
Sunrise Jewelry claimed that Fred committed fraud upon the PTO
because the PTO had not yet acknowledged dismissal of the
cancellation proceeding when Fred filed its declaration, and thus, the
cancellation proceeding was not yet terminated.233  Sunrise Jewelry
also argued that Fred’s registration became contested before the
                                                                
223. See id. (disagreeing with Sunrise’s contentions that Fred made mis-
representations to the PTO or that its registrations should be cancelled).
224. See id. (explaining registration for a “‘metallic nautical rope design as an
integral feature of the goods,’ which includes clocks, watches, and jewelry made of
precious metal”).
225. See Sunrise Jewelry, 175 F.3d at 1323, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (sequencing
the procedures that followed Fred’s registration of a “metallic nautical rope” design
as an internal feature of the goods).
226. See id. at 1322, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
227. See id. at 1323, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (detailing procedural
background).
228. See id.
229. Id. (quoting from Fred’s Declaration of Use and Incontestability).
230. See Sunrise Jewelry, 175 F.3d at 1323-24, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533-34
(describing the proceedings taking place between April 1995 and March 1996).
231. See id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
232. See id. at 1324, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 (citing fraud in Fred’s
statements in its Declaration submitted to the PTO).
233. See id. at 1327, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536.
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PTO accepted Fred’s Section 15 affidavit.234  The Federal Circuit
rejected both arguments.235  The court found that, because Fred had
notified the PTO of the settlement and withdrawal of the case
between Fred, the defendant, and Al-Or and Charriol, “it would have
been reasonable [for Fred] to believe that no proceeding was
pending in view of the previously filed withdrawal of the cancellation
proceeding.”236  The court also stated that Fred did not perpetrate
fraud upon the PTO because the counterclaims filed in the
subsequent suit had not yet been alleged when Fred filed its Section
15 affidavit.237  Finally, the court held that because “the Lanham Act
imposes no continuing duty to update a Section 15 affidavit,” Fred’s
failure to update also did not constitute fraud.238
2. Registration of “phantom” marks prohibited
In In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.,239 the Federal Circuit broadly
ruled that “phantom” trademarks cannot be federally registered.240
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. (“IFF”) sought registration of
“LIVING XXXX FLAVORS” “LIVING XXXX FLAVOR” and “LIVING
XXXX” in connection with goods such as oils, smoking tobacco,
chewing gums, and flavor used to manufacture food items and
beverages.241  The “XXXX” feature of each claimed mark designated a
“phantom” portion of the mark, broadly denoting it “a specific herb,
fruit, plant or vegetable” or “a botanical or extract thereof.”242
                                                                
234. See id.
235. See id. (affirming the findings of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trial
and Appeal Board).
236. Id.
237. See id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536 (citing JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M.
SAMUELS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1604.03 (1st ed. 1974) [hereinafter TMEP], which states that “[a] proceeding
involving the mark in which the registrant is the plaintiff, and there is no
counterclaim involving the registrant’s rights in the mark, does not preclude
acceptance of a § 15 affidavit”).
238. See id. (citing TMEP, supra note 237, § 1604, which recognizes no duty to
update a Section 15 affidavit when a counterclaim is filed).
239. 183 F.3d 1361, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
240. See Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (citing the
lack of proper notice to other trademark users as defeating one of the vital elements
of federal trademark registration).
241. See id. at 1363-64, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (describing items the IFF
sought to target for registration as:
essential oils for use in the manufacture of flavored foodstuffs, smoking
tobacco compositions, smoking tobacco articles, chewing tobacco
compositions, chewing gums, oral care products and beverages in
International Class 3; and non-synthetic and synthetic flavor substances for
use in the manufacture of flavored foodstuffs, smoking tobacco
compositions, chewing tobacco compositions, smoking tobacco articles,
chewing gums, oral care products and beverages in International Class 30).
242. Id. at 1364, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
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Although the possible number of separate marks covered by the
application—even if the phantom element were accepted—would
likely be too numerous to count, an example of a covered composite
mark might be “LIVING GREEN BELL PEPPER FLAVORS.”243
The Federal Circuit appropriately took a dim view of “phantom”
marks, concluding that registration of a phantom mark constitutes
registration of more than a single mark in one application, a
prohibited practice.244  In support of its ruling, the court emphasized
that property rights begin in a trademark, not at registration, but at
first use in commerce, and two important registration policies were
implicated by IFF’s phantom mark applications.245  First,
“[r]egistration of a trademark, in addition to serving the interest of
the registrant by providing constructive notice, serves the interests of
other participants in the market place.”246  Under this reasoning,
consumers benefit because entrepreneurs can create new goods and
services that are less likely to cause consumer confusion in the
marketplace.247  In addition, entrepreneurs benefit because they are
able to invest substantial time, money, and effort in developing a
product or service under the presumption that no other confusing
marks are present in the marketplace.248
Second, the court stated that the other implicated registration
policy “encourage[s] the presence on the register of trademarks of as
many as possible of the marks in actual use so that they are available
                                                                
243. Id. at 1368 n.6, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 n.6 (illustrating the purpose of
prohibiting phantom trademarks by providing a title easily identifiable in a
trademark search).
244. See id. at 1366, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994),
which states:  “The owner of a trademark . . . may apply to register his or her
trademark under this chapter on the principal register established:  . . . (3) By
complying with such rules or regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be
prescribed by the Commissioner”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.51(a)(1) (2000) (“In an
application under Section 1(a) of the [Lanham] Act, the drawing of the trademark
shall be a substantially exact representation of the mark as used on or in connection
with the goods . . . .”); TMEP, supra note 237, § 807 (2d ed. 1993, rev. 1.1 1997)
(“There may not be more than one mark on a drawing, since an application must be
limited to one mark.”).
245. See Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1366-67, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516-17
(explaining the reasons why the “federal registration of a trademark does not create
an exclusive property right in the mark”).
246. See id. at 1367, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (quoting Natural Footwear Ltd.
v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1395, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1104, 1111-12
(3d Cir. 1985) (citing Weiner King, Inc. v. The Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512,
523-24, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820, 830-31 (C.C.P.A. 1980))).
247. See id. (drawing its reasoning from Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1395, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1111-12, and Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523-24, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 830-31).
248. See id. (discussing the reasoning behind Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1395,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1111-12 (citing Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523-24, 205 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 830-31)).
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for search purposes.”249  To promote the policies of constructive
notice and achieving comprehensive availability searches, the court
wrote that “the mark, as registered, must accurately reflect the way it
is used in commerce so that someone who searches the registry for
the mark, or a similar mark, will locate the registered mark.”250
Phantom marks, it reasoned, “encompass too many combinations and
permutations to make a thorough and effective search possible.”251
Therefore, the Court denied registration of IFF’s marks.252
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s decision raises more questions
than it answers.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit seemed unaware that
many marks containing phantom portions are the subject of active
federal registrations.253  Interestingly, the currently registered
phantom marks appear to take at least two different forms.  Some
existing phantom marks purport to “disclaim” the phantom portion
of the mark, just as one would with an unregistrable or non-
distinctive component, like a generic term or a descriptive term that
has not acquired distinctiveness.254  Others actually purport to
“exclude” the phantom portion from the mark as registered.255
Because the Federal Circuit failed to acknowledge or even
recognize the existence of active registrations for phantom marks, the
decision does not help to predict how the validity of these
registrations will be treated when placed under scrutiny.256  However,
                                                                
249. Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1367, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (quoting
Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
250. See id. at 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (citing accuracy to be integral as
one form of constructive notice in the registration process).
251. See id.  The court also noted that an analysis of the likelihood of confusion
compares “all elements” of two marks, and that someone wanting to register “LIVELY
SPICE” may not come across “LIVING XXXX FLAVOR” in a search.  Id. at 1368 n.6,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 n.6.  In commerce, however, “LIVING XXXX
FLAVOR” may be “LIVING SPICE FLAVOR,” which may be confusingly similar to
“LIVELY SPICE.”  Id. (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
252. See id. at 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (affirming the decision of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trial and Appeal Board).
253. See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), Original
USPTO Web Trademark Database, Number Search (last modified July 7, 2000), at
www.uspto.gov/tmdb/index.html [hereinafter USPTO Web Trademark Database]
(U.S. Reg. No. 2,145,578:  dashes indicate various telephone codes); id. (U.S. Reg.
No. 2,157,432:  dashes indicate various product names according to the subject
matter of the goods); id. (U.S. Reg. No. 2,020,164:  dashes represent three numbers
which vary according to geographic location); id. (U.S. Reg. No. 1,331,186:  “X”s
represent a year); id. (U.S. Reg. No. 1,868,539:  dashes indicate calendar year
designations).
254. See, e.g., id. at U.S. Reg. No. 1,331,186; see also id. at U.S. Reg. No. 1,868,539.
255. See, e.g., id. at U.S. Reg. No. 2,145,578; see also id. at U.S. Reg. No. 2,157,432.
256. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (highlighting the difficulty in
distinguishing between “LIVING SPICE FLAVOR” and “LIVELY SPICE” during a
trademark search).
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combining the Federal Circuit’s dim view of phantom marks in
International Flavors and its reasoning regarding disclaimers in In re
Wada, the Federal Circuit’s decision likely will be interpreted not to
permit new registrations of marks with phantom portions, even if
they are disclaimed.257  More difficult to predict is whether the
phantom marks already registered will be open targets in cancellation
proceedings, and whether the PTO will continue to register marks
where the applicant purports to exclude the phantom portion from
the mark as registered.258
The issue of whether existing phantom mark registrations are now
vulnerable to cancellation may turn on whether cancellation
constitutes a retroactive application of new law.  If it is permissible to
cancel on the ground set forth in International Flavors, then the
question becomes whether the vintage of the registration or its
incontestable status prevents it from cancellation.  Because trademark
registrations may be cancelled within five years of the initial
registration date if the registration is ruled void ab initio,259
International Flavors may suggest that newer phantom mark
registrations—those less than five years old—are more vulnerable
than older ones.260
Even in the face of the Federal Circuit’s broadly worded
prohibition in International Flavors, while it is fairly clear that merely
disclaiming phantom elements from a registered mark will not avoid
the prohibition, it appears that marks with phantom elements could
still be registered if the applicant excludes (as opposed to, disclaims)
the phantom portion from the registered mark.261  Then the problem
likely becomes whether the mark, as registered, constitutes a material
alteration or mutilation of the mark as actually used in commerce.262
                                                                
257. See Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1368 n.6, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 n.6
(stating that to conduct a proper likelihood of confusion analysis, all elements of the
mark must be considered).
258. See supra notes 250-51, 257 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood
of confusion when registering phantom marks).
259. See Int’l Mobile Machs. Corp. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 800 F.2d 1118, 1119,
231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 142, 142 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (allowing cancellation of a registration
on any grounds that would have prevented the initial registration).
260. Because void ab initio registrations more than five years old are not subject to
cancellation under any of the expressed limited bases set forth in Section 14 of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), the vulnerability of phantom
mark registrations over five years old seems less compelling.
261. See Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (holding that
registration of phantom marks does not provide proper notice to other trademark
users).
262. See id. (describing the fact that to make the registration of a mark meaningful
and valid, the mark must be found in a way that reflects accurately how it is used in
commerce).
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The PTO will likely continue to refuse registration of a mark when
the drawing or specimen is not a “substantially exact representation”
of the mark as it is used in commerce.263  Depending on the nature of
the phantom mark the applicant is attempting to register, the PTO
will likely refuse such registration, even in the face of a statement on
the record excluding the phantom element from the applied-for
mark.  The above would apply when the excluded phantom element
is significant enough to render the drawing of the mark less than a
“substantially exact representation” of the mark as used in
commerce.264  The applicant, then, is left to argue that the
elimination of the phantom portion does not constitute a material
alteration and, thus, the applicant should be allowed to register the
mark.265
B. Distinctiveness
The Federal Circuit frequently deals with the issue of trademark
distinctiveness.  For a designation to be registrable on the Principal
Register or protectable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, it
must be “distinctive.”266  To be distinctive, a designation must be
utilized and recognized as a form of identification.267  Distinctiveness
can be inherent or acquired.  Inherently distinctive designations “by
their nature are likely to be perceived by prospective purchasers as
symbols of identification that indicate an association with a particular
source.”268  An acquired distinctiveness is referred to as a “secondary
meaning,” and is required to be shown either to register or protect
federally a designation that is not inherently distinctive, such as a
phrase that is merely descriptive.269
                                                                
263. See TMEP, supra note 237, § 807; 37 C.F.R. § 2.51(a)(1) and 2.51(b)(1)
(2000) (describing the trademark drawings that are required in an application for
trademark registration).
264. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (describing the Sunrise Jewelry
case in which petitioners claimed the mark was “substantially altered” because of its
generic nature).
265. See Sunrise Jewelry, 175 F.3d 1322, 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532, 1535-36
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (describing Fred’s argument that genericness is not applicable to
product configuration marks, and, therefore, his mark should be registered
accordingly).
266. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, cmt. a
(1993) (“[A] designation is protectable as a trademark . . . only if the designation is
‘distinctive.’”).
267. See id. (“A designation is distinctive only if it functions as a symbol of
identification.”).
268. See id.
269. See id. § 13, cmt. e (1993) (explaining that more substantial evidence of a
trademark’s secondary meaning is needed to establish its distinctiveness).
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1. Genericness
Generic designations, by definition, are not inherently distinctive
and are legally incapable of becoming distinctive.270  Thus, they
cannot be federally registered or protected.271  Generic designations
exist in two possible forms.  They may be inherently generic or may
otherwise acquire generic qualities.272  An example of an inherently
generic designation would be to use the word “CHAIR” to designate a
four-legged seat.  The best known example of a designation that
acquired a generic label, a process known as “genericide,”273 is
“ASPIRIN”, now a generic name for a popular analgesic.274
a. Phrase constituents
In In re The American Fertility Society,275 the Federal Circuit continued
to make it difficult for the PTO to establish prima facie cases of
inherent genericness.276  The court rejected the PTO’s attempt to
refuse registration based solely on the genericness of each of the
phrase constituents.277  In doing so, the court held that the PTO did
not meet its burden of proof solely by examining the genericness of
the phrase constituents.278
In American Fertility, the American Fertility Society (the “Society”)
attempted to register the claimed mark, “AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE.”279  After two previous office actions
refused registration of the mark, the examining attorney issued a
                                                                
270. See Stephen R. Baird, Note, Putting the Cart Before the Horse in Assessing
Trademark Validity-Toward Redefining the Inherently Generic Term, 14 J. CORP. L. 925, 927
(1989) (explaining the invalidity of a generic term as a trademark because, instead of
denoting a source, a generic term denotes the product or service itself).
271. See id. at 927-28 (determining that because a generic mark is not distinctive of
the goods or services to which it is applied, it deserves no protection under
trademark law).
272. See id. at 930 (acknowledging the fact that two types of generic findings exist).
   273.   2 MCCARTHY, supra note 86, § 12 (describing the term “genericide” as
referring to the process by which a trademark loses its distinctiveness and becomes
generic, thus losing trademark protection).
274. See Bayer, Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(granting an injunction against direct sales of acetyl salicylic acid under the title of
‘aspirin’ to chemists, physicians and retail druggists because of the distinctiveness
that the title had obtained).
275. 188 F.3d 1341, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
276. See id. at 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
277. See id. (remanding the case to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trial
and Appeal Board to apply the correct test for genericness).
278. See id. at 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (holding that a correct
determination regarding eligibility for registration depends on the genericness of
the whole phrase instead of its individual constituents).
279. See id. at 1342-43, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832-33 (detailing case
background).
BAIRDJCI.DOC 6/19/2001  10:51 AM
2000] 1999 TRADEMARK DECISIONS 1359
third and final office action requiring a disclaimer of every word in
the mark,280 finding the phrase to be “the generic name for the
identified services.”281  The examining attorney asserted that “a
composite term can be generic without being defined in the
dictionary or used [by others] as a composite term, if the term, as a
whole, has no more meaning than the sum of the meanings of each
of its constituent parts.”282  Because the Society had already
disclaimed the term “society,” the examining attorney argued—and a
majority panel of the Board agreed—that she had met her burden of
proof on finding genericness by evidencing a record ninety-nine
pages of Lexis-Nexis references to reproductive medicine.283  The
Board continued with its reasoning:  “the fact that [the] applicant
may be the first and only user of this generic designation does not
justify registration if the term projects only generic significance.”284
As a result, the Board affirmed the examining attorney’s decision,
with one judge dissenting.285
The Federal Circuit disagreed with both the majority panel of the
Board and the examining attorney, finding the term to be generic.286
In support of its decision, the court discussed three relevant cases:  H.
Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc.,287 In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,288 and In re Gould Paper Corp.289  In
Marvin Ginn, the Federal Circuit held that “FIRE CHIEF” for a fire
fighting publication was not inherently generic because no evidence
suggested “that the relevant portion of the public refers to a class of
fire fighting publications as ‘Fire Chief,’” and “the term . . . is neither
the name of the fire-fighting industry nor about the fire-fighting
industry.”290
In Merrill Lynch, the Federal Circuit held that “CASH
                                                                
280. The applicant previously disclaimed the word “SOCIETY”, and the issue
herein involved the phrase “FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE.”  Id. at 1343, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833 (discussing the circumstances behind the disclaimer).
281. Id. (quotations omitted).
282. Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d at 1343-44, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833 (citing In
re Gould Paper Corp., 835 F.2d 1017, 1018, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110, 1111-12 (Fed.
Cir. 1987)).
283. See id. (finding the numerous articles sufficient to demonstrate that the
relevant compound was generic).
284. Id., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
285. See id. at 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (Hanak, J., dissenting) (stating
that the examining attorney “failed to make of record any evidence whatsoever
demonstrating that the unitary phrase SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE
has been used in a generic sense”).
286. See id. at 1348, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
287. 782 F.2d 987, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
288. 828 F.2d 1567, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
289. 834 F.2d 1017, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
290. Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 991, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 532.
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MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT” for money management services was
not generic.291  The court emphasized that a rather substantial burden
to prove generic use falls on the examining attorney.292  Because the
mark did not “immediately and unequivocally describe[] the purpose
and function of [Merrill Lynch’s] goods,” it was not generic.293
While the Board in American Fertility Society relied on the above
cases to affirm the registration refusal on the ground of genericness,
it emphasized the reasoning in Gould Paper.  In Gould Paper, the
Federal Circuit—appearing to ease the PTO’s weighty burden of
proving genericness—found the mark “SCREENWIPE”294 to be
generic without any demonstrated use of the exact composite.295  The
court held that the PTO satisfied its burden by showing “evidence
including dictionary definitions that the separate words joined to
form a compound have a meaning [to the relevant public] identical
to the meaning common usage would ascribe to those words as a
compound.”296  The fact that the packaging for the “SCREENWIPE”
product contained the phrase “a . . . wipe . . . for . . . screens”
persuaded the court.297  Such evidence, along with dictionary
definitions for the individual components of the composite,
sufficiently met the PTO’s burden of establishing genericness.298
The Federal Circuit in American Fertility Society, however, interpreted
the rule in Gould Paper as:  “[I]f the compound word would plainly
have no different meaning from its constituent words, and
dictionaries, or other evidentiary sources establish the meaning of
those words to be generic, then the compound word too has been
proved generic.”299  Limiting Gould Paper to its facts, the court
delineated a two-part test for the PTO to follow in refusing
registration based on inherent genericness:
                                                                
291. See Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d at 1571, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (reversing and
remanding the Board’s decision because it offered no conclusion as to the
sufficiency of the showing of descriptiveness).
292. See id. at 1571, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143 (requiring the examining
attorney to present “clear evidence” to prove generic use).
293. See id. at 1571, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (citing In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588
F.2d 811, 816 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
294. The court described a “SCREENWIPE” as an ““pre-moistened, anti-static
cloth for cleaning computer and television screens.”  Gould Paper, 834 F.2d at 1017, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
295. See id. at 1018, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111-12 (ruling same).
296. See id.
297. See id. at 1019, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112 (stating that the packaging makes
certain that the public would perceive the mark as a common name and not a source
identifier).
298. See id. (finding the collective evidence enough to demonstrate that the mark
has an inherently generic meaning in ordinary language).
299. In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832,
1836 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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[I]f the PTO can prove (1) the public understands the individual
terms to be generic for a genus of goods and species; and (2) the
public understands the joining of the individual terms into one
compound word to lend no additional meaning to the term, then
the PTO has proven that the general public would understand the
compound term to refer primarily to the genus of goods or services
described by the individual terms.300
The Federal Circuit confined Gould Paper “to compound terms
formed by the union of words.”301  Reasoning that “[it] is legally
erroneous to attempt to apply the language [in Gould] to phrases
consisting of multiple terms, which are not ‘joined’ in any sense other
than appearing as a phrase,”302 the court found that the PTO “clearly
failed to carry its burden” with respect to its examination of the
“AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE” mark.303
The Board cannot simply cite definitions and generic uses of the
constituent terms of a mark, or in this case, a phrase within the
mark, in lieu of conducting an inquiry into the meaning of the
disputed phrase as a whole to hold a mark, or a phrase with the
mark, generic.304
The Court vacated the prior decision and remanded the case with
instructions to apply the legal test described in Marvin Ginn.305  In
effect, American Fertility Society reaffirms the heavy burden that the
PTO faces in making genericness refusals, especially those for phrases
comprising multiple words.
b. Trade dress
In Sunrise Jewelry, discussed above,306 the Federal Circuit held that a
registered trade dress may be cancelled if it is found to be
“generic.”307  Sunrise Jewelry sought to cancel Fred’s incontestable
federal trade dress registration of a “metallic nautical rope design”
for clocks, watches, and jewelry due to genericness of the claimed
                                                                
300. Id. at 1348-49, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
301. Id. at 1348, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
302. Id.
303. See id. at 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (requiring “evidence of ‘the
genus of goods or services at issue’ and the understanding by the general public that
the mark refers primarily to ‘that genus of goods or services’”).
306. See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing Sunrise Jewelry in relation to committing
fraud on the PTO).
307. See Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1326, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing the Board’s construction of
“generic name” because it narrowly identified a class of goods as opposed to a
product made from a single source).
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trade dress.308  Fred argued that the plain meaning of the Lanham Act
specifically allows for cancellation of a “generic name,” and because
trade dress is not such a name, at least under a literal reading of the
statute, incontestable product configuration trade dress registrations
should not be subject to cancellation for genericness.309
The court refused to interpret Section 14 this narrowly because
doing so would explicitly contradict the Act’s purpose.310  The court
wrote that “[t]he Lanham Act provides national protection of
trademarks in order for owners of marks to secure the goodwill of
their businesses and in order to protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers.”311  The court reasoned that
the “source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status
as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign”—best served the basic
purpose of indicating the good’s source.312  If any claimed mark,
including product configurations, could not indicate a source due to
genericness, the Federal Circuit deemed it appropriate to cancel such
registrations, regardless of the literal limitation for cancellation of
“generic names” in Section 14 of the Act.313  The court also opined
that any other interpretation of the statute would grant trade dress
holders more protection than trademark or service mark holders, a
result altogether unjustified.314  The court then remanded the case to
determine whether Fred’s trade dress was generic.315
2. Descriptiveness
In In re Storopack Hans Reichenecker GmbH & Co.,316 the Federal
                                                                
308. See id. at 1323, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533; see also supra Part II.A.1.b
(discussing Sunrise Jewelry’s claim for cancellation based on fraud).
309. See Sunrise Jewelry, 175 F.3d at 1325, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.  Section 14
of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part, that a mark may be cancelled “[a]t
any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, . . .
for which it is registered.”  15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis
added).
310. See Sunrise Jewelry, 175 F.3d at 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536 (reasoning
that a limited interpretation would allow incontestable trademarks to retain an
incontestable designation even though they do not act as source designators).
311. See id. at 1325, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
312. See id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)).
313. See id. at 1325-26, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535 (reasoning that to hold
otherwise would contravene the purpose of the Lanham Act, namely to prevent
exclusive use of a mark that identifies a class of goods).
314. See id. at 1325, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535 (determining the Lanham Act
covers anything that has the potential to serve as a source indicator, including trade
dress).
315. See id. at 1327, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536 (vacating the Board’s dismissal
of Sunrise Jewelry’s petition for cancellation and instructing the Board to make a
generic finding for Fred’s mark).
316. 194 F.3d 1335, No. 98-1588, 1999 WL 302320 (Fed. Cir. May 6, 1999).
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Circuit, applying the old clear error standard,317 affirmed the Board’s
determination that the  claimed intent-to-use mark, “PAPERFILL,”
for pourable package shipping material was merely descriptive under
Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, and thus not entitled to federal
registration.318  The court stated that “a mark ‘may be descriptive
though it merely describes one of the qualities or properties of the
goods,’” and “PAPERFILL” describes the packaging material’s
composition—paper.319
a. Laudatory terms
In In re The Boston Beer Co.,320 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board’s registration refusal of the mark “The Best Beer In America,”
holding that it was “so highly laudatory and descriptive as to be
incapable of acquiring distinctiveness as a trademark.”321  The court
arrived at this decision despite annual advertising expenditures of ten
million dollars, including two million dollars of advertising that
included the claimed mark “The Best Beer in America.”322
The court explained that “laudation does not per se prevent a
mark from being registrable,” but noted that the specific facts of each
case would control.323  Nevertheless, the court believed that, based
upon the facts of this case, the proposed mark was only “a common
phrase used descriptively by others before and concurrently with
Boston Beer’s use, and is nothing more than a claim of superiority.”324
Although the Federal Circuit could have affirmed the registration
refusal on the ground that the applicant failed to meet his burden of
establishing acquired distinctiveness, it unnecessarily issued a broader
ruling than was required to decide the case before it.  Absent a
finding of genericness by the Board or the Federal Circuit, the court
inappropriately ruled that the claimed mark was forever “incapable”
of acquiring distinctiveness or becoming registered.325  The Federal
                                                                
317. See supra Part I.A (discussing the APA’s standards of review for federal
administrative agencies).
318. See Storopack Hans Reichenecker, 1999 WL 302320, at *1.  Because the mark was
filed on an intent-to-use basis and use had not yet commenced, registration under
Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act was not an option.  Id.
319. See id. (quoting In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1218, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1009,
1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
320. 198 F.3d 1370, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
321. See Boston Beer, 198 F.3d at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
322. See id. at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (ruling that Boston Beer, despite
the advertising, had not met its burden to show that the mark had acquired a
secondary meaning).
323. Id.
324. See id. at 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59.
325. See id. at 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (relying on the substantial
evidence to support the Board’s conclusion about non-registerability).
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Circuit’s apparent endorsement of the Board’s “so highly descriptive
to be incapable” test perpetuates bad law and is difficult to reconcile
with its 1985 decision, In re Seats, Inc.326  Perhaps Boston Beer signifies
the Federal Circuit’s agreement with the Board’s prior
characterization of the applicable language in Seats as mere dictum.327
b. Geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks
The Federal Circuit ruled in In re Wada328 that the North American
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) Implementation Act329 precludes
registration of primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks, even when the geographic elements of those marks are
disclaimed.330  More specifically, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board’s decision to refuse registration of the composite mark “NEW
YORK WAYS GALLERY,” even with “New York” disclaimed, on the
ground the mark is “primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive”331 and, therefore, is subject to refusal under Section
2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act.332
A mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive if it
“(1) [has] as its primary significance a generally known geographic
place, and (2) identif[ies] products that purchasers are likely to
believe mistakenly are connected with that location.”333  The applicant
                                                                
326. 757 F.2d 274, 276, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(criticizing the highly descriptive test, noting that a mark must be incapable of
serving as a trademark to be generic).
327. See generally Baird, supra note 270, at 952-53 (criticizing the highly descriptive
test).
328. 194 F.3d 1297, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Wada
I].
329. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e) & (f)) (effective Jan. 1, 1994).  The Act amended Sections 2(e) and (f) of
the Lanham Act to preclude registration of any mark that is “primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive” of the applicant’s goods or services,
regardless of any acquired distinctiveness, unless the mark acquired distinctiveness
prior to December 8, 1993, the date of enactment.  See NAFTA Implementation Act,
§ 331, 107 Stat. at 2114 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
330. See Wada I, 194 F.3d at 1298, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539 (same).
331. See id. (concluding the Board’s decision was not “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence”).
332. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting registration
of a trademark “when [it is] used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant
[and] is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them”).  Section 2(f)
of the Lanham Act now expressly prevents registration of such marks even if they
have acquired distinctiveness.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (“Except as expressly excluded
in subsections . . . (e)(3) . . . of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the
registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods in commerce”).
333. See Wada I, 194 F.3d at 1300, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540; see also Institute
National Des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1580, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reiterating the two-prong test used to
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argued that although its goods did not originate from New York, its
mark was used in connection with leather bags, luggage, wallets, and
other goods to evoke a certain New York style.334  The court rejected
this argument because various leather goods and handbag
manufacturers operate in New York, and the applicant failed to
demonstrate a “New York style” with respect to leather goods.335  Also,
because New York is a world-renowned fashion center, the Federal
Circuit did not disturb the Board’s finding that consumers will
mistakenly think the applicant’s goods possess some connection to
New York.336
The importance of the In re Wada case stems from the portion of
the decision ruling that a disclaimer of geographic terms could not
save the mark.  The Federal Circuit noted that before the 1993
NAFTA Amendments to the Lanham Act, registration of “primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive” marks was permitted when
marks acquired secondary meaning or geographic terms were
disclaimed.337  Despite the silence in the legislative history addressing
disclaimers following the NAFTA Amendments to the Lanham Act,
the PTO began to employ a policy of refusing registration of any
mark that is “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive,”
even including those with disclaimers.338  The Federal Circuit
endorsed this policy change as complying with the spirit of the
NAFTA Amendments to the Lanham Act, stating that “[p]rimarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, like deceptive
                                                                
classify primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks).
334. See Wada I, 194 F.3d at 1300, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540 (reciting that the
applicant proffered that “NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY” is fanciful or arbitrary and
not geographic because New York Ways Gallery is fictitious).
335. See id. at 1300, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (noting reliance on
manufacturer records and Lexis-Nexis excerpts as evidence of numerous leather
goods manufacturers in New York).
336. See id. (supporting Board’s holding that there is a “goods/place association”
between goods with the “NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY” mark and goods from New
York); see also In re Wada, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1689, 1691 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter Wada II] (rejecting applicant’s argument that consumers would identify
that mark with distinction or fame rather than a geographic location).
337. See Wada I, 194 F.3d at 1300-01, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (noting the
major change in the Lanham Act after the NAFTA Amendments:  a prohibition
against registration of “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks”
even if they acquire secondary meaning or disclaim deceptive terms); see also 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 86, § 14.30; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 86, § 19.64 (reiterating
the guidelines for registering primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks prior to NAFTA amendments to Lanham Act).
338. See Wada I, 194 F.3d at 1301, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (noting official
statement issued by the PTO prohibiting registration of such marks); see also TMEP,
supra note 237, § 1210.06 (perm. ed. rev. 1997) (reiterating post-NAFTA policy
prohibiting registration of primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks).
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marks, mislead the public even with a disclaimer,”339 and adding that
permitting use of such marks with mere disclaimers would create
anomalous results. 340  Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision
to deny registration of the mark.341
3. Secondary meaning
In Riggs Marketing, Inc. v. Mitchell,342 the Federal Circuit applied
Ninth Circuit trademark law to reverse the district court’s
determination “that the jury’s finding of secondary meaning [in
connection with the term UNIVERSAL for a golf club bending
machine] was supported by substantial evidence. . . .”343  In Riggs
Marketing, both plaintiff Riggs and defendant Mitchell manufactured
golf club bending machines.344  Riggs claimed trademark rights in the
word “UNIVERSAL,” first used in January of 1996 to describe its
machines.345  The “UNIVERSAL” mark was also used in January,
March, and May of 1996 in various advertisements.346  Mitchell used
“UNIVERSAL” in a May 1996 advertisement for its bending
machines, stating across the top of the advertisement, “UNIVERSAL
STANDARD FOR MEASURING AND BENDING WOODS, IRONS &
PUTTERS,” with “UNIVERSAL STANDARD” in larger type.347
The Federal Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit law,348 listed six factors
to determine whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning:
(1) whether actual purchasers of the product bearing the claimed
                                                                
339. Wada I, 194 F.3d at 1301-02, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
340. See id. at 1301, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542 (quoting Wada II, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1692 (asserting that a reversal of the Board’s decision “would be anomalous to
prohibit[ing] registration [of a] primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive
[mark], but allowing registration of the same geographically deceptively
misdescriptive mark with a mere disclaimer of the geographic element”).
341. See id. at 1302, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542 (accepting the Board’s decision
as correct in following the NAFTA Amendments to the Lanham Act).
342. 194 F.3d 1338, Nos. 98-1507, 98-1551, 1999 WL 399710 (Fed. Cir. June 8,
1999) (unpublished table decision).
343. Riggs Mktg., 1999 WL 399710, at *6 (holding jury lacked sufficient evidence to
find a secondary meaning).
344. See id. at *1.
345. See id. (acknowledging Riggs’s use of the mark “UNIVERSAL” in an
advertisement in January of 1996).
346. See id. at *6.  Evidence demonstrated that these advertisements cost Riggs
Marketing $1,800.00, and the journal’s circulation was approximately 1,500 copies
per issue.  Id.  No evidence was presented regarding the circulation of Riggs’ first
advertisement, which allegedly cost $900.00.  Id.  The court noted that Riggs
Marketing used “UNIVERSAL” in other advertisements; however, Riggs Marketing
offered no evidence as to when these advertisements occurred in relation to the
alleged infringement, and, thus, the advertisements could not be used to show the
mark acquired secondary meaning before Mitchell’s first use.  Id.
347. See id. (describing the advertisement).
348. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s application of law
analysis).
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trademark associate the trademark with the producer, (2) the
degree and manner of advertising under the claimed trademark,
(3) the length and manner of use of the claimed trademark[],
(4) whether use of the claimed trademark has been exclusive,
(5) whether defendant engaged in ‘exact copying’ of plaintiff’s
purported mark, and (6) whether defendant’s use of the purported
mark has led to actual consumer confusion.349
Perhaps as important, the Federal Circuit noted that a mark must
have acquired secondary meaning by the time of the alleged
infringement to be protected as a trademark.350  Given Riggs
Marketing’s minimal use of the “UNIVERSAL” mark before
Mitchell’s first use, Riggs Marketing also attempted to establish
secondary meaning by asserting that Mitchell intentionally copied the
mark.351  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, stating that
Mitchell properly used the mark in a descriptive non-trademark
fashion.352  Because Riggs Marketing failed to prove its claimed mark
had acquired secondary meaning before Mitchell’s first use, the court
reversed the judgment that the claimed mark was infringed as lacking
substantial evidence.353
4. Functionality
Trade dress must be non-functional, regardless of its distinctiveness
to be protectable.354  The most recent Restatement of Unfair
                                                                
349. Riggs Mktg., 1999 WL 399710, at *4 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
350. See id. at *5 (emphasizing Riggs Marketing’s “UNIVERSAL” mark could not
receive trademark protection because it had not acquired secondary meaning prior
to Mitchell’s alleged infringement in May of 1996).
351. See id.  The Federal Circuit concluded that Mitchell’s use of “UNIVERSAL” in
its advertisement did not demonstrate “copying for the purposes of trading . . . .”  Id.
352. See id. (designating Mitchell’s use of the term “UNIVERSAL” as simply
descriptive and, therefore, legal).
353. See id. at *6 (reversing the district court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict).  The jury also found that Mitchell
willfully infringed Riggs Marketing’s mark, and, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117, the
district court awarded attorney’s fees to Riggs Marketing.  See id. at *2 (finding the
case to be exceptional).  Section 1117(a) provides that “[w]hen a violation of any
right of the registrant of a mark registered in the [PTO] . . . shall have been
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be
entitled . . . to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).  The statute further provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  Id. (limiting the award of attorney’s
fees to three times the amount of actual damages).  The Federal Circuit also reversed
the jury’s decision regarding Mitchell’s willful infringement.  See Riggs Mktg., 1999
WL 399710, at *6.
354. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. a (1995) (noting
that functional designs are not entitled to trademark protection, allowing
competitors to copy such designs).
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Competition explains:  “The rule excluding functional designs from
the subject matter of trademark law is an attempt to identify
situations in which the public and private interest in avoiding
confusion is outweighed by the anti-competitive consequences of
trademark protection.”355  Accordingly, when “determining whether a
particular design is ‘functional,’ and therefore ineligible for
protection as a trademark, the ultimate inquiry is whether a
prohibition against copying will significantly hinder competition by
others.”356
a. De jure functionality of “rust-type” color
The Federal Circuit held in L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc.357 that the
trial court erred in finding a rust-type color for light fixtures was de
jure functional.358  In reaching its decision, the lower court359 discussed
and relied on the U.S. Supreme Court decision Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co.360 and the Federal Circuit decision Brunswick Corp. v. British
Seagull.361
In Qualitex, the Court held that a green-gold color for dry cleaning
pads claimed as a trademark was protectable because the color had
acquired distinctiveness and had no alternate function.362  The lower
court in Kichler, however, viewed its facts more analogously to those
facts of Brunswick.363  In Brunswick, the court held that the color black
for outboard motors was de jure functional because the color was
                                                                
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. 192 F.3d 1349, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Kichler II).
358. See id. at 1353, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (reversing the district court’s
holding that Olde Brick color was de jure functional).  In Brunswick Corp. v. British
Seagull, 35 F.3d 1527, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the Federal Circuit
explained the difference between de facto functionality, which may be entitled to
trademark protection, and de jure functionality, which is not entitled to such
protection.  “In essence, de facto functional means that the design of a product has a
function, i.e., a bottle of any design holds fluid.  De jure functionality, on the other
hand, means that the product is in its particular shape because it works better in this
shape.”  Id. at 1531, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1122.
359. See Kichler I, No. 1:96CV2022, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22464, at *19 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 29, 1998) (granting in part and denying in part Davoil’s summary judgment
motion).
360. 514 U.S. 159, 174, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (1995) (clarifying that
color alone cannot automatically prohibit a trademark classification).
361. 35 F.3d 1527, 1529, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(affirming the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trial and Appeal Board’s decision
to refuse registration of the color black because it is de jure functional).
362. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (establishing that
color alone can be protected under trademark law unless there exists a mitigating
reason to find otherwise).
363. See Kichler I, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22464, at *8 (concluding Olde Brick finish
is color-compatible with other home finishes and, therefore, functional, which,
following Brunswick, prohibits Olde Brick from receiving trademark protection).
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compatible with numerous boat colors, and caused the motors to
appear smaller.364  The lower court in Kichler considered the testimony
of several directors of L.D. Kichler Company’s (“Kichler”) directors,
who stated that the rust-type color—called “Olde Brick”—was
compatible with many home furnishings and was, thus “very
acceptable.”365  According to the district court, this color
compatibility, like the color black for outboard motors, prevented
Kichler’s light fixtures’ color from being a protected trademark.366
The court reasoned:
The Court in Brunswick explained that there is a right to compete
through imitation of a competitor’s product that can only be
temporarily denied by the copyright laws.  Trademark protection is
potentially permanent so trademark protection would destroy that
right.  The functionality doctrine allows the individual to protect
symbols that identify the source of particular goods but the
functionality doctrine also provides the right to compete
effectively.367
The Federal Circuit ruled, however, that the lower court “failed to
examine ‘whether [the use of Olde Brick] as a mark would permit
[Kichler] to interfere with legitimate (non-trademark-related)
competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an
important product ingredient,’” and remanded the case with
instructions to examine the issue accordingly.368
The Federal Circuit also noted that “[t]his examination of
competitive need ‘should not discourage firms from creating
[a]esthetically pleasing mark designs, for it is open to their
competitors to do the same. . . .  Mere taste or preference cannot
render a color—unless it is ‘the best, or at least one, of a few superior
designs’—de jure functional.”369  The court then noted that mere
                                                                
364. See Brunswick, 35 F.3d at 1529, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (clarifying that
black is not functional because it makes engines more easily or makes them less
expensive, but rather because black is compatible with a wide range of boat colors
that makes motors seem smaller).
365. Kichler I, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22464, at *7-8 (noting the testimonies of
Kichler’s Director, David Porter, its Vice-President, Bob Doernberger, and its
Chairman, Harold Sam Minoff).
366. See id. at *8 (emphasizing color-compatibility as a key factor in determining
functionality, which in turn bars trademark protection).
367. Id. at *4-5.
368. L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d 1349, 1353, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Kichler II) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 170, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165-66 (1995)).
369. Id. (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166).  See
Brunswick, 35 F.3d at 1533, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124 (“Aesthetic ingredients to
commercial success are not necessarily de jure functional. . . . Color compatibility and
ability to decrease apparent motor size are not in this case mere aesthetic features.
Rather, these non-trademark functions supply a competitive advantage.”).
BAIRDJCI.DOC 6/19/2001  10:51 AM
1370 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1321
customer preference of the color was not enough to find de jure
functionality of Kichler’s trade dress.370  According to the Federal
Circuit, to conclude that the color is de jure functional, the lower
court must find Olde Brick to be “one of a few colors that [is]
uniquely superior for use in home decorating.”371
b. Conflicts between trade dress functionality and patent law protection
In Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.,372 the Federal
Circuit solidified the rule that trade dress protection of a product
configuration remains possible despite the fact that the same features
are also protected by design patents.373  Plaintiff Midwest Industries,
Inc. (“Midwest”) manufactured and sold trailers designed to haul
watercraft behind automobiles.374  At the front of Midwest’s trailer was
a patented curved winch post designed to pull the watercraft onto the
trailer.375  Midwest alleged that Karavan Trailer’s, Inc. (“Karavan”)
infringed two Midwest patents, as well as state and federal trade dress
rights, for its curved winch post by making a similar design.376
The district court, though bound by Eight Circuit law,377 granted a
motion to dismiss Midwest’s trade dress claims by relying on Tenth
Circuit law, which prohibits features protected by utility patents also
to be protected by trade dress law.378  The district court never
determined whether Midwest’s trade dress was functional.379
                                                                
370. See Kichler II, 192 F.3d at 1353, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (directing the
district court to consider this caveat before rendering its decision).
371. Id.
372. 175 F.3d 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 527 (1999).
373. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1362, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (verifying
that trade dress protections and patent protections are independent rights, such that
trade dress protection for a product is not contingent upon the acquisition of a
patent).
374. See id. at 1357, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673-74 (same).
375. See id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (describing the design of the winch
post).
376. See id. (noting that Midwest claims Karavan violated the Lanham Act, the
Iowa trademark statute, and Iowa common law regarding trademarks).
377. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s application of law
analysis).
378. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1358, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (citing
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1332, 1342 (10th Cir. 1995), which held that a product configuration cannot
receive trademark protection when it is a “described, significant inventive” part of a
utility patent claim because without such components, the invention could not be
considered the same invention).
379. See id. (noting that the district court denied Midwest trade dress protection
under the Lanham Act because the curved winch post is part of a patent claim and,
therefore, a “significant inventive aspect” of a patent, rather than addressing its
functionality under trademark law).  For trade dress to be protectable, they must be
distinctive and non-functional.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 120 S.
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The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, decided that Federal Circuit
law should apply to determine whether patent law preempts trade
dress law.380  In deciding this question, the court looked to the
development of the functionality doctrine and noted that trademark
rights do not conflict with patent law by extending a patent
monopoly.381  Instead:
[Patent and trademark law] exist independently of it, under
different law and for different reasons.  The termination of either
has no legal effect on the continuance of the other.  When the
patent monopoly ends, it ends.  The termination of either has no
legal effect on the continuance of the other.  The trademark rights
do not extend it.  We know of no provision of patent law, statutory
or otherwise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy
the subject matter of any expired patent.  Patent expiration is
nothing more that the cessation of the patentee’s right to exclude
held under the patent law.382
The Federal Circuit also noted, however, that although the two
concepts exist independently from each other, statements in a patent
might indicate that a trade dress is functional.383
                                                                
Ct. 1339, 1344-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1067-70 (2000).  In Wal-Mart, the
Supreme Court held that unregistered product configuration trade dress cannot be
inherently distinctive and can be protected only upon a showing of secondary
meaning.  Id. at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.  Thus, had the district court
found that Midwest’s trade dress features were functional, the Federal Circuit could
have affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Midwest’s trade dress claims
without remand.  See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1364-65, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1678-80 (noting that the district court used Tenth Circuit precedent in finding that
the curved winch post was a “significant inventive aspect” of a patent and denying it
trademark protection, rather than using the Lanham Act, under which the post
would qualify for such protection).
380. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75
(abandoning application of regional circuit law in cases addressing patent law
issues); see also supra Part I.D.2 for discussion of the court’s decision to apply federal
circuit law.
381. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1363, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (quoting
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 158, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1847 (1989) (“Trade dress protections do not impermissibly interfere with the
federal patent scheme, the Court [of Customs and Patent Appeals] explained, as
they have traditionally been ‘limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional
aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning such that
they operate as a designation of source.’”)).
382. Id. at 1362, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (quoting In re Mogen David Wine
Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 575, 579 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
383. See id. (citing In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 6
(Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41, 213
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 9, 15-16 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348,
181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821, 824 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).  Merely requiring a patent, however,
does not convert what otherwise would have been protected trade dress into
unprotected matter.  The court in Midwest Indus., quoting In re Deister Concentrator
Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961), noted, “we are not seriously concerned with
whether he who claims trademark rights of unlimited duration now has or did have
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The Federal Circuit held that patent law does not preempt state or
federal trade dress law, noting that this decision is consistent with
more recent decisions of the Supreme Court and other circuits.384
Because the district court dismissed the non-patent claims solely on
the basis of a contrary rule it should not have applied, the Federal
Circuit remanded the case both for a determination as to whether
Midwest’s trade dress may be protected under state or federal laws,
and, more particularly, for a determination as to the possible
functionality of Midwest’s curved winch post.385
C. Likelihood of Confusion:  Dissimilarities Between Marks Can Be
Dispositive
In determining whether applications should be refused,386 and
oppositions or cancellations sustained under Section 2(d) of the
Lanham Act,387 the PTO and its reviewing court continue to weigh the
                                                                
patent protection, or what that protection was.”  175 F.3d at 1362-63, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1678.
384. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1362-64, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.  The
primary case discussed by the court was Bonito Boats, in which the Supreme Court
held that, although states cannot create patent-like rights through non-patent means,
other non-patent protections, such as trade dress protection, are not foreclosed by
patent law.  See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.  The Tenth
Circuit is the only circuit to hold that patent protection preempts trade dress
protection.  See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498,
1499, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1333 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that patent
protection preempts trade dress protection when the product configuration is both
claimed in a patent and is a significant inventive aspect of the patented invention,
even if the configuration is nonfunctional).
385. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1364-65, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.  The
Federal Circuit expressed that a trade dress is functional if it is “essential to the use
or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”  Id. at 1362,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 165, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (1995)).  The lower court also now must
consider whether Midwest’s product design has acquired secondary meaning in light
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
120 S. Ct. 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1070 (2000).  The Wal-Mart
decision required owners of unregistered trade dress to show acquired distinctiveness
or secondary meaning to have protectable trade dress.  Id.
386. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (barring registration of a mark
that “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark . . . as to be likely . . . to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or deceive . . . .”); see also TMEP, supra note 237, § 1207.01 (stating
that  “a refusal pursuant to Section 2(d) is normally based upon the examining
attorney’s conclusion that the applicant’s mark as used in conjunction with the
specified goods or services, so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause
confusion”).
387. See Carl Karcher Enter., Inc. v. Stars Rests. Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125,
1128 (T.T.A.B. 1995) (employing the DuPont likelihood of confusion factors to
sustain an opposition to Stars Restaurant’s application to register marks brought
pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act).  Section 13 of the Lanham Act
provides for opposition of published marks that would violate Section 2(d) if
registered.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (permitting “any person
who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the
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well-settled DuPont likelihood of confusion factors.388
The Federal Circuit, in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Tocad Co.,389 once
again endorsed the rule that “findings based on a single DuPont
factor may, in some cases, be so important as to be dispositive of the
likelihood of confusion analysis,” and relied on its previous decisions
in Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enterprises, Inc.390 and Champagne Louis Roedere,
S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards.391  In SmithKline, SmithKline Beecham
                                                                
principal register . . . [to] file an opposition in the [PTO] stating the grounds
therefor, within thirty days after the publication . . . of the mark sought to be
registered”).  Section 14 provides for cancellation of registered marks that violate
Section 2(d) so long as the Petition for Cancellation is filed on or before the fifth
anniversary of the registration date.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(waiving the five year time limit to petition for cancellation under the following two
scenarios:  (1) if the registered mark becomes, in the eyes of the relevant public, the
generic name for goods and services on or in connection with that which it has been
used, and (2) in the case of a certification mark, if the registrant does or cannot
control the use of the mark, or produces or markets any goods or services to which
the certification mark is applied, or permits the use of the certification mark for
purposes other than to certify that goods or services of a person who maintains the
standards which such mark certifies).
388. See In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (identifying the confusion factors).  These factors
are:
(1) [t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression; (2) [t]he
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services . . . ; (3) [t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels
(4) [t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e.,
‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) [t]he fame of the prior
mark (sales, advertising, length of use); (6) [t]he number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) [t]he nature and extent of any
actual confusion; (8) [t]he length of time during and conditions under
which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion;
(9) [t]he variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
‘family’ mark, product mark); (10) [t]he market interface between applicant
and the owner of a prior mark . . . ; (11) [t]he extent to which applicant has
a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) [t]he extent
of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimus or substantial; (13) [a]ny
other established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id.
389. No. 99-1128, 1999 WL 668722 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 1999).
390. 951 F.2d 330, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  The Kellogg
Company, owner of the famous mark “FROOT LOOPS,” opposed Pack’em
Enterprises, Inc.’s (“Pack’em”) mark “FROOTEE ICE” for liquid frozen bars.  See id.
at 331, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.  The Federal Circuit held that the Board did
not err in relying solely on the “dissimilarities between the marks” factor to grant
summary judgment of no likelihood of confusion in favor of Pack’em.  See id. at 333,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
391. 148 F.3d 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Champagne
Louis Roederer, S.A. (“Roederer”), owner of the marks “CRISTAL” and “CRISTAL
CHAMPAGNE” initiated an opposition proceeding to prevent registration of
Delicato Vineyard’s (“Delicato”) mark “CRYSTAL CREEK” for wine.  See id. at 1374,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.  The Board held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed,
that no likelihood of confusion would exist between the marks based solely on the
“dissimilarities between the marks” factor.  See id. at 1375 (citing Kellogg, 951 F.2d at
322-23, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444-45).
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Corporation (“SmithKline”) sought to cancel Tocad Company
Limited’s (“Tocad”) registration of “AQUA FLOSS” for an oral
irrigator because of likely consumer confusion with its oral hygiene
family of marks, including “AQUA FRESH,” “AQUAFRESH,” “AQUA-
FRESH,” and “AQUA-FRESH FLEX.”392  In determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists, the factfinder generally looks to a
number of factors, such as “similarity of the marks as to appearance,
sound or commercial impression, the similarity of the nature of the
goods or services, and the fame of the prior mark.”393
In SmithKline, the Federal Circuit determined that the facts made
“the most important [DuPont] factor [to be] the dissimilarities
between the two marks.”394  The court then held that AQUA FRESH
and AQUA FLOSS “have substantially different meanings and
impressions—FRESH indicating an attribute, while FLOSS indicates a
function,” and that “the differences between the marks simply
outweigh all other relevant . . . factors,” including the fame of the
AQUA FRESH family of marks.395
III. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES:  GRAY-MARKET GOODS IMPORTATION  AND
UNITED STATES TRADEMARK LAW
In Gamut Trading Company v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n,396 a
gray-market goods trademark case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
United States International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) decision
that Gamut Trading Co. (“Gamut”) infringed Kubota Tractor
                                                                
392. See SmithKline, 1999 WL 668722, at *1 (noting that, on appeal, SmithKline
argued both that the “AQUA FRESH” and “AQUA FLOSS” marks are similar in
connotation and commercial impression and that the Board wrongly discounted the
fame of the “AQUA FRESH” marks).  Cancellation may be based on 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d) if the mark “so resemble[s] a mark [previously] registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office . . . as to be likely . . . to cause confusion.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(indicating that if, under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), a trademark consists of a mark that “so
resembles a mark previously registered in the [PTO]” and is likely to cause
confusion, then, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1064, a petition to cancel the mark may be
brought at any time).
393. SmithKline, 1999 WL 668722, at *1 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567).  Importantly, the DuPont court noted that the relative weight
of a given factor should be determined on a case by case basis.  See DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567 (“We find no warrant . . . for discarding any
evidence bearing on the likelihood of confusion.  Reasonable men may differ as to
the weight to give specific evidentiary elements in a particular case.”).
394. SmithKline, 1999 WL 668722, at *2 (justifying their reliance on one DuPont
factor—the dissimilarities between two marks—while also noting that “their repeated
findings that a single factor may be dispositive of the likelihood of confusion
analysis).
395. See id. (holding that such evidence was both substantial and sufficient to
support a finding of dissimilarity).
396. 200 F.3d 775, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Corporation’s (“Kubota”) U.S. trademark.397  The term “gray-market
goods” refers to genuine goods legally acquired abroad, but imported
into the United States without the consent of the trademark owner.398
Kubota manufactures tractors specifically designed for different
areas of the world, including the United States and Japan.399  Gamut
purchased used Kubota tractors in Japan and imported them into the
United States.400  Kubota initiated an ITC action asserting that Gamut
had violated Section 1337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,401 and described
the imported goods as “gray-market” goods.
Importation of gray-market goods infringes the U.S. trademark
owner’s rights when a “material difference” occurs between the
foreign and domestic product.402  “Material difference” requires “no
more than a showing that consumers would be likely to consider the
differences between the foreign and domestic products to be
significant when purchasing the product, for such differences would
suffice to erode the goodwill of the domestic source.”403
                                                                
397. See id. at 778, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (holding that Gamut violated
§ 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and noting that the United States International Trade
Commission, in selecting a remedy—a general exclusion order and a cease and desist
order—did not abuse its discretion).
398. See id. (citing K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286-87, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1897, 1899-900 (1987) (discussing various gray-market conditions)).
399. See id. (indicating, more specifically, that Kubota, through Kubota-US,
imports used tractors bearing the Kubota mark, and provides full service and
maintenance to all imports).
400. See id. (stating that Kubota learned of Gamut’s importation and its extent
when Gamut’s domestic purchasers sought service and repairs from Kubota-US
dealerships).
401. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998))
(designating as an “unfair practice in import trade” the “importation into the United
States . . . of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark
registered under the Trademark Act of 1946”).
402. See Gamut, 200 F.3d at 779, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265 (stating not only
that the key question in gray-market cases concerning foreign goods regarding
materiality but also that the materiality is low); see also Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc.
v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1302, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1807 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding trademark infringement of authentic “Herend”
porcelain imported into the United States because it was different in color, pattern
or shape); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1579, 1587 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding dishwashing liquid sold in the United
States to be materially different than that sold in the United Kingdom); Original
Appalachian Artworks v. Granada Elec., 816 F.2d 68, 73-74, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1343, 1348-49 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding importation of “Cabbage Patch” dolls with
instructions and adoption papers in the Spanish language infringed the U.S.
trademark owner’s rights); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 675, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1017 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding no material difference when
the products are exactly the same); NEC Elec. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506,
1510-11, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2056, 2060-61 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding no material
difference when the companies are commonly controlled).
403. Gamut, 200 F.3d at 779, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.  The court further
noted that “any higher threshold would endanger a manufacturer’s investment in
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The ITC found, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that the
differences between all but one of the tractors designed for the
United States and Japan were material.404  The court also noted that
“differences that may be readily apparent to consumers may
nevertheless be material.”405  The Court considered differences in the
construction of the tractors, the language on the warning labels, and
the fact that U.S. dealers were unable to repair the Japanese
models.406  The court also held that it was irrelevant that the tractors
were used goods because consumer confusion would exist regardless,
diminishing the goodwill of the Kubota established “Kubota” mark.407
Gamut was ordered to cease importing into the United States and to
cease selling Japanese Kubota tractors already imported, unless the
tractors bore “a permanent, non-removable label alerting the
consumer to the origin of the used tractors and containing other
information deemed necessary to mitigate consumer confusion.”408
                                                                
product goodwill and unduly subject customers to potential confusion by severing
the tie between a manufacturer’s protected mark and its associated bundle of traits.”
Id. (quoting Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
641, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1256, 1263 (1st Cir. 1992)).
404. See id. at 781, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (indicating that the models
differed in terms of structural strength, speed, size, the availability of parts in the
United States, the availability of service in the United States, and the language used
on tractor labels).
405. See id. at 780, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266; see also Martin’s Herend, 112 F.3d
at 1302, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (holding trademark infringement of authentic
“Herend” porcelain imported into the United States because it was different in color,
pattern, or shape); Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (finding
differences in quality, composition, and packaging to be material); Ferrero U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240, 1243-44, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1052,
1055 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding material difference in the print and content of labels on
“Tic-Tac” mints).
406. See Gamut, 200 F.3d at 781, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (explaining that, as
a result of the many differences in tractor construction, Kubota-US dealers were
unable to provide adequate service to purchasers of Gamut used tractors,
engendering customer dissatisfaction and anger).
407. See id. at 783, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (“Although it is relevant to
consider whether the imported product is new or used, other factors that may affect
the reputation and the goodwill enuring to the holder of a trademark are not
overridden by the fact that the product is known to be second-hand.”); see also Red
Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 281, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1548, 1553 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding used circuit boards purchased abroad and
imported into the United States without the copyright holder’s consent were gray-
market goods); Sims v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449,
1451 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding used Mercedes Benz automobiles were gray market
goods under the definitions of both the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1994),
and the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745, 1379)).
408. Gamut, 200 F.3d at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268 (indicating that
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1994), an exclusion order is the Commissioner’s
statutory remedy for trademark infringement, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f), the
Commission may issue a cease and desist order when it has personal jurisdiction over
the party to whom the order is directed, and the Commission may affirm the order).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:  FIRST AMENDMENT
In Ritchie v. Simpson,409 the dissenting and majority opinions briefly
discussed the possible constitutional implications of granting Ritchie
standing to oppose the marks “O.J. Simpson,” “O.J.” and “The Juice,”
under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.410  The dissenting opinion
raised the constitutionality concern by citing what it believed to be
applicable Supreme Court precedent:  “[I]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”411  The dissent also
cited numerous cases standing for the proposition that “regulation of
commercial speech may [not] . . . guard against . . . a matter of
suppression of social content.”412 The dissent also cited legal
commentary on this point. 413
                                                                
409. 170 F.3d 1092, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Ritchie II).  For
further discussion of the case, see supra Part I.A (discussing standing to oppose an
immoral or scandalous mark).
410. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1099, 1103-04, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023, 1028-29
(reversing the Board’s decision to dismiss Ritchie’s opposition for lack of standing
and remanding the case for further proceedings).  Significantly, the majority did not
address the constitutional standing issue because it was not raised or considered by
the lower court, nor argued or briefed before the Federal Circuit.  Id. at 1099, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028.
411. See id. at 1104, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)) (illustrating the dissent’s
concern over the potential for abuse in the Court’s removing the requirement that
an opposer have a real, personal interest, beyond a general public interest, in order
to have standing to oppose a trademark registration).
412. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (holding that a
state may not prohibit commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning
fashion); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983) (finding that
the fact that commercial speech may offend some individuals does not justify its
suppression); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (stating
“[that] advertisements of contraceptive products would be offensive and
embarrassing to those exposed to them, and that permitting them would legitimize
sexual activity of young people [are] classically not justifications validating the
suppression of expression”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens’ Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (noting that even “tasteless and excessive”
commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment)).
413. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4-33 (1984)
(“‘Abridging’ within the meaning of the First Amendment may occur even if the law
in question does not by its terms either prohibit or punish speech.”); Baird, supra
note 24, at 667-701 (discussing the controversy surrounding the “scandalous” and
“disparaging” tests derived from Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, including a lengthy
discussion of the constitutionality of Section 2(a)); Davis, Jr., supra note 24, at 802-04
(offering a critique of Section 2(a) jurisprudence, contending that refusing to
register marks other than those in which the government has a compelling interest
in prohibiting all together is irreconcilable with the First Amendment); Jendi B.
Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters:  Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should
be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 192 (1996) (“Section 2(a) [of the Lanham
Act] cannot constitutionally be applied to marks on the basis of their political
offensiveness, and that Section 2(a)’s ban on registration of ‘immoral’ and
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The majority responded to these concerns by stating that
preventing the registration of a mark on the federal register does not
prevent anyone from using the mark.414  The dissent countered,
noting that a denial of benefits, i.e., a federal registration, “may be
viewed as an abridgment of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”415  In response, the majority indicated it must continue
to apply the law as written until it is found unconstitutional.416
Nevertheless, dissenting Judge Newman’s review of Supreme Court
precedent causes her to conclude that the Court would agree with
her views if it were to decide the issue.417
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s 1999 trademark decisions covered a wide
variety of procedural and substantive issues, some of first
impression.418  Many of the decisions significantly added to the court’s
                                                                
‘scandalous’ marks is detrimental to our political and cultural dialogue.”).
414. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030 (“Although the
mark holder who is denied federal registration will not receive the benefits conferred
on a federal trademark registrant, the mark holder may and can continue to use the
mark.”).
415. Id. at 1103, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an abridgment may result from a law that merely burdens an exercise of
speech); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a
person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, . . . [the
government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”);
Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (“Under some
conditions, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions, or
taxes.”).
416. See Ritchie II, 170 F.3d at 1099, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030 (noting that the
Lanham Act, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1063, authorizes any person who “believes he
would be damaged” by a registration to bring his or her concerns before the agency,
and holding that Ritchie’s pleadings established a “real interest” in the outcome of
the opposition).
417. See id. at 1103-04, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032-33 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (suggesting that while regulation of commercial
speech may guard against such wrongs as fraud and false advertising, such
regulations may not function as a matter of suppression of social content); Cent.
Hudson v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (discussing the
permissible limits of governmental commercial speech, indicating that under the
following conditions commercial speech comes within the protection of the First
Amendment:  (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading, (2)
the speech must not impinge upon a substantial government interest, (3) any  limits
must directly advance the governmental interest asserted, (4) any limits must not be
more extensive than necessary to satisfy any existing government interest); Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (holding that trademarks are a form of
commercial speech)).
418. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (listing all trademark cases
decided by the Federal Circuit at the close of 1999, and noting those cases that were
of first impression).
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growing body of trademark precedent.419  The best of the Federal
Circuit’s 1999 trademark decisions was Judge Michel’s careful and
detailed genericness analysis in American Fertility Society.420  The
weakest of the Court’s decisions was Ritchie, not because it permitted
O.J. Simpson’s name and nickname marks to be challenged under
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, but because neither the majority nor
the dissent noticed that they misread the statute.  The court
incorrectly collapsed the separate and distinct “scandalous” and
“disparaging” standards into one standard that now reads, according
to the Federal Circuit, “scandalous matter which may disparage.”421
In the end, however, the court fared quite well in rendering its 1999
trademark decisions.
                                                                
419. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (listing both cases of first
impression decided by the Federal Circuit and cases in which the Federal Circuit
vacated and reversed lower court decisions).
420. For further discussion of the genericness analysis employed by Judge Michel,
see supra Part II.B.1, which notes that Judge Michel, opining for the Federal Circuit,
continued the court’s trend against genericness findings, holding that the PTO
failed to establish a prima facie case by examining solely the genericness of the phrase
constituents.
421. For a discussion of the court’s analysis in Ritchie I and Ritchie II, see supra Part
1.A., which explains the requirements necessary to have standing to oppose a
scandalous or immoral mark).  For further discussion of the constitutional issues
raised in Ritchie II, see Part IV, which explores the differing viewpoints held by the
majority and the dissent in Ritchie II, and suggests that Section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act should not be applied constitutionally to marks on the basis of their
offensiveness).
